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ABSTRACT 
Cyberespionage is a prolific threat that undermines the power projection capacity of the 
United States through reduced economic prowess and a narrowing of the technical 
advantage employed by the American military. International attempts to limit hostile 
cyber activity through the development of institutions, normative patterns of behavior, or 
assimilation of existing laws do not provide the American national security decision 
maker with a timely or effective solution to address these threats. Unfortunately, the 
stove-piped, redundant and inefficient nature of the U.S. counterintelligence community 
does not provide a viable alternative to mitigating cyberespionage in an effective manner. 
Instituting a domestic and international micro-restructuring approach within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) addresses the need for increased effectiveness within an 
environment of fiscal responsibility. Domestic restructuring places emphasis on 
developing a forcing mechanism that compels the DoD counterintelligence services to 
develop joint approaches for combating cyberespionage by directly addressing the needs 
of the Combatant Commands. International restructuring places an emphasis on 
expanding cybersecurity cooperation to like-minded nations, and specifically explores the 
opportunity and challenges for increased cyber cooperation with Taiwan. This approach 
recognizes that Taiwan and the United States are both negatively affected from hostile 
cyber activity derived from within the People’s Republic of China.  
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I.  THESIS INTRODUCTION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
How can restructured domestic and international partnerships focused 
towards mitigating the national cyberthreat improve effectiveness within 
the U.S. counterintelligence enterprise?   
The wording of this research question correctly suggests that increasing 
effectiveness within the U.S. counterintelligence enterprise is the goal. Addressing the 
national cyberthreat by restructuring domestic and international partnerships therefore 
becomes a tool to address this goal. Domestically, research will focus on combining 
capabilities of Department of Defense (DoD) counterintelligence elements and 
comparing them to efforts currently underway in other branches of government as a 
means to increase effectiveness in combating the cyberthreat. Internationally, a 
comparative approach will be used that focuses on the development of liaison 
relationships between DoD law enforcement counterintelligence units and traditional and 
non-traditional partners; namely, the traditional Australian, British and American trifecta 
validated against an expanded cyber cooperation posture with Taiwan.  
B. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will include both an international relations theory and comparative 
case study approach to introduce a framework by which the national security decision 
maker can level judgments about increasing effectiveness of counterintelligence to 
mitigate the cyberespionage threat. This analysis has been juxtaposed with direct 
consultations with key international and domestic policy experts who collectively present 
a decision making model for restructured effectiveness of counterintelligence to combat 
the totality of the national cyberthreat. These leaders include decision makers within the 
U.S. counterintelligence community (USCI), DoD and the Taiwanese government. 
Moreover, consultation with these individuals was intended to provide a working 
framework by which the larger issue of effectiveness could be addressed; as such, the 
need for specific identification is not only unnecessary, but would otherwise obfuscate 
the structure of the model they have indirectly provided. Concern over this sourcing issue 
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is not confined strictly to the protection of identity, but also to the unintended parallels 
the reader could draw from analyzing the institutions that these individuals represent. 
Analysis of U.S.-Taiwan cooperation clearly includes the political complexities of 
U.S. policy regarding the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While a detailed analysis of 
these complexities is outside the scope of this thesis, a study of U.S.-Taiwan military to 
military relations will provide the context for increasing cooperation into other areas. 
Consultation with personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for 
Policy has provided amplifying details regarding the political complexities that could 
arise from increased liaison between the U.S.-Taiwan. This consultation has taken place 
via e-mail and personal meetings in Washington D.C. 
Additional context is necessary to detail the complex and disjointed nature of the 
U.S. counterintelligence community. This context shows the need for reorganization and 
proves that large-scale, top-down reorganization has been and will continue to be 
unsuccessful at developing a robust national CI institution. Relying on previous 
scholarship to support the micro-restructuring of Naval Criminal Investigation Service 
(NCIS) and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), this thesis will study the 
feasibility of merging capabilities toward the single non-geographic mission set of 
cybersecurity. In doing so, it provides recommendations that remove redundancies and 
streamline capabilities. Analysis of these redundancies was obtained from published 
reports and statements from U.S. leaders as they addressed the issues surrounding the 
U.S. counterintelligence community’s attempt to deal with the cyberespionage threat. 
C. A WORKING LEXICON  
This thesis uses the term “hostile cyber activity” as an all-inclusive phrase used to 
describe any event conducted in cyberspace that opposes the state’s ability to maintain a 
monopoly on power within its borders. This includes cyberattack for a political or 
entertainment purpose, all forms of cybercrime, the preemptive use of cyberweapons in a 
military conflict and cyberespionage.   
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In addition, this thesis makes use of the language currently accepted by the 
cyberspace operations community as advanced by U.S. Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM). The most frequently used terms of the USCYBERCOM lexicon used 
in this report are: 
 Cyberspace: A global domain within the information environment consisting of 
the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and 
associated data that includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer 
systems and the processors and controls that make these elements function.1  
 Computer Network Attack (CNA):  Offensive cyberspace operations that are 
specifically intended to deny or manipulate information or infrastructure in 
cyberspace.2 
 Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO): Attempts to direct and synchronize 
cyberspace actions to detect, analyze, counter and mitigate cyberthreats and 
vulnerabilities.3 
 Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO): Attempts or actions conducted that 
seeks to create enabling or attack effects in cyberspace or to actively defend 
information networks.4 
 Cyberwarfare: The inherently military use of cyberspace as intended to support a 
combatant commander’s military objectives.5  Such actions can include CNA, 
DCO and OCO. 
 
D. INTRODUCTION OF THESIS CONCEPT  
1. The Intended Audience 
Counterintelligence is an often misunderstood and misrepresented field within the 
national security establishment. This is in part due to the classified nature of the work, a 
combination of sub-disciplines within the field and a culture of secrecy among those who 
practice its craft. These factors have generally produced limited information by which the 
national decision maker or scholar can build a holistic understanding of the role that 
                                                 
1 United States Cyber Command, “The USCC Cyber Lexicon: A Language to Support the 
Development of Cyber Capabilities, and the Planning and Execution of Military Cyberspace Operations,” 
Version 4.1, Pre-Decisional Draft (30 March 2011), 7. 
2 Ibid., 8. 
3 Ibid., 11. 
4 Ibid., 12. 
5 Ibid., 5. 
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counterintelligence plays in providing for the national interest. As such, matters relating 
to the structure and function of the counterintelligence institution are generally left for 
bureaucratic insiders to debate on their own. Improving the decision maker’s ability to 
adequately judge counterintelligence effectiveness requires a more robust literature in the 
unclassified realm. Through such a literature, the role of counterintelligence in 
safeguarding the competitive advantage of the United States in both economic and 
military matters can be more adequately explored. This thesis therefore seeks to stimulate 
and contribute to a more robust dialogue regarding the impact and importance of 
counterintelligence for the academic, professional and decision making audience.      
2. The Lack of a Definitive Literature 
A significant factor in the lack of a robust counterintelligence literature is based 
on the premise that the current literature is broad in scope, but limited in quality. This is 
primarily due to the complexity of the counterintelligence discipline juxtaposed to its 
classified standing. The complex nature of the counterintelligence field has produced a 
body of literature that is filled with inaccuracies, misconceptions and scant professional 
discourse. Sherman Kent addressed the lack of literature in the field of intelligence more 
than half a century ago, “[a]s long as this discipline [counterintelligence] lacks a 
literature, its method, its vocabulary, its body of doctrine and even its fundamental theory 
runs the risk of never reaching full maturity.”6  His claims ring true for the field of 
counterintelligence today. 
The literature review conducted for this thesis sought to navigate the broad scope 
of the counterintelligence mission and placed boundaries around those aspects of the 
discipline that do not address the thesis topic. Essentially, this constraint restricts the 
restructuring debate to topics that produce the unity of effort required by the 2005 
National Counterintelligence Strategy.7  The concept of unity of effort is just as strong 
today as it was in 2005, yet it was left out of the preceding 2008 and 2009 National 
                                                 
6 Sherman Kent, “The Need for an Intelligence Literature,” Studies in Intelligence (Washington, DC: 
Center for the Study of Intelligence, fall 1955), 3. 
7 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “The National Counterintelligence Strategy of 
the United States of America 2005,” 4. 
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Counterintelligence Strategies.8  In an environment of fiscal restraint and a pervasive 
cybersecurity threat, unity of effort within the counterintelligence enterprise is as 
fundamentally important as it has ever been. 
3. The Need for Structural Reform 
Furthering the need for a more robust unclassified literature is the general lack of 
effectiveness across the counterintelligence enterprise. The U.S. counterintelligence 
community has been described as fractured, myopic and marginally effective.9  The 
stove-pipes created from a national intelligence community comprised of seventeen 
members, each with separate and distinct counterintelligence authorities, remains the 
largest burden to effective mitigation of adversarial intelligence threats in the United 
States.10  The establishment of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) 
demonstrated recognition on the part of the national security decision maker to create 
efficiencies and address effectiveness within the counterintelligence community. 
However, the prevalence of the individual agency structures that initially produced such 
stove-pipes has limited the NCIX from accomplishing its lofty objective. This failure 
underscores the need for a bottom-up approach to restructuring vice the additional 
bureaucratic layering and top-down approach that has already been found lacking.   
Effective restructuring at the micro-level is more likely to produce efficiencies 
that can be replicated throughout the counterintelligence community. A 
counterintelligence system restructured to develop integrated partnerships within USCI, 
while leveraging the knowledge gained through international partnerships, can remove a 
degree of the barriers that prevent counterintelligence from effectively safeguarding the 
national interest. The study of this approach necessitates a singular mission that is not 
limited to geographic jurisdictions or one that is otherwise marred by complicated 
                                                 
8 See Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “The National Counterintelligence 
Strategy of the United States of America 2008”; and Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 
“The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2009.” 
9 U.S. Congress, “Chapter Eleven Counterintelligence,” The Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (31 March 2005), 485. 
10 Joel Brenner, “Strategic Counterintelligence,” American Bar Association: Standing Committee on 
Law and National Security (The University Club, Washington, DC: 29 March 2007), 30; Joel Brenner, 
“Joel Brenner, of Counsel: Biography,” Cooley LLP (2011), <http://www.cooley.com/jbrenner>. 
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domestic law enforcement, intelligence and military counterintelligence guidelines. The 
national cyberthreat, is such, a transnational mission and the study of its mitigation 
provides a concentrated area of study though which such micro-restructuring initiatives 
can be explored. 
A counterintelligence system restructured to develop integrated partnerships 
within USCI, while leveraging the knowledge gained through international partnerships, 
removes some of the barriers that prevent counterintelligence from effectively 
safeguarding the national interest. Using the national cyberthreat as the catalyst to 
explore such structural changes is the foundation of this report. In an effort to maintain 
academic integrity, this thesis explores both the nature of and the proposed solutions for 
current cybersecurity challenges. In doing so, it attempts to provide a rigorous analysis of 
the various options available to the national security decision maker. 
E. A MODEL FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM 
The study of intelligence reform—of which counterintelligence is a critical 
component—necessitates a conceptual model that provides structure to a subject that is 
complex, opaque and bound in secrecy. The model chosen for this thesis borrows aspects 
of New Institutionalism and combines them with several key tenants from the study of 
Civil-Military Relations (CMR), namely, the two aspects of effectiveness in achieving 
roles and missions and efficiency.11  This overarching model of intelligence reform was 
proposed by Thomas Burneau and Steven Boraz in their book Reforming Intelligence. 
They note that “intelligence has specific roles and missions, the study of which 
establishes a way to analyze intelligence community structures and their implications for 
democratic civilian control and effectiveness.”12  This statement places an emphasis on 
understanding the roles and missions of intelligence in an effort to analyze effectiveness. 
Applied to counterintelligence, this approach necessitates an exploration of the roles and 
missions that are vital to counterintelligence, specifically, as they relate to 
cyberespionage mitigation. 
                                                 
11 Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz, Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and 
Effectiveness (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007), 4. 
12 Ibid., 2. 
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While the evaluation of roles and missions is critical for any meaningful analysis 
of effectiveness, there is also a structural need to analyze how these roles and mission are 
derived. The New Institutionalist model fills this need and therefore becomes the second 
component of Bruneau and Boraz’s method to evaluate intelligence reform. The 
collection of analytic concepts known as New Institutionalism places an emphasis on the 
importance that institutions have upon how actors manage power within society.13   In 
doing so, the model assumes that individuals are rational self-interested maximizers and 
that their institutions matter.14  Defining institution, as referenced by this approach, is 
crucial for understanding how this analysis translates to counterintelligence reform.  
This thesis uses the Institutionalist definition of institution as the formal and 
informal procedures, routines, norms, or conventions embedded within the structure of a 
polity or political unit.15 This understanding of institution used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of counterintelligence places an emphasis on the culture and norms that the 
actors within the discipline use as a means to delegate power and authority in the 
fulfillment of their mission objectives. In fact, “the creation and implementation of 
institutions are all about power”16 and New Institutionalism is primarily concerned with 
the manner in which power is distributed within any given institution. 
Amy Zegart, in her book Flawed by Design, utilizes a New Institutionalist 
framework to evaluate the initial design of the U.S. national security system as a means 
to stress the importance of creating effective bureaucratic structures during initial agency 
development. Zegart uses the model to describe a U.S. intelligence community that is 
hindered by ineffective design and built to resist major overhaul.17 These factors 
contribute to an overall lack of effectiveness within the intelligence community and 
difficulty in producing adequate reform. Zegart’s analysis applied to the topic at hand 
                                                 
13 Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence, 3. 
14 Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford University 
Press, 1999), 210. 
15 Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political 
Studies, vol. 44 (1996), 938. 
16 Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence, 4. 
17 Zegart, Flawed by Design, 223, 227.   
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places an emphasis on the difficulty of macro-level reform within the USCI and the need 
to create an understanding of the actors that form the rules of the game and how the rules 
will be implemented.18 
Addressing reform within the national security apparatus of an established 
democracy typically focuses on increasing efficiency and effectiveness vice democratic 
civilian control. As this thesis deals with the U.S. counterintelligence community, it will 
focus primarily on effectiveness in the completion of goals and objectives and efficiency, 
as it becomes a significant issue for maintaining effectiveness within an environment of 
fiscal restraint. This approach, supplemented with a New Institutionalist model that 
demonstrates the complications involved in major reform, will provide the analytic 
framework by which this thesis will evaluate counterintelligence restructuring options. 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main problem associated with this research lies with the general paradox that 
exists when studying intelligence within a democratic system; primarily, that the 
secretive nature of intelligence conflicts with a democratic system that demands 
transparency.19  This challenge is not new to the study of intelligence, but it makes the 
evidentiary needs of this thesis more complicated in an unclassified format. That said, 
there are significant unclassified contemporary and historical materials that deal with the 
structure and function of the Intelligence Community (IC) in the United States.   
1. Problems within the Counterintelligence Enterprise 
The literature addressing effectiveness in U.S. counterintelligence is decades old. 
Geschwind (1963) called for a restructuring of USCI in order to address a system that 
was decentralized, subordinate and ineffective.20  He described a 1960s USCI apparatus 
that was so fragmented it was unable to even comprehend its own “aggregate inability” to 
affect the threat posed by Communist secret services.21  In dealing with the same issue 
                                                 
18 Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence, 4.   
19 Ibid., 17. 
20 Geschwind, C. N. “Wanted: An Integrated Counter-intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 3 
(summer 1963), 15–37. 
21 Ibid., 15.  
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several years later, Matschulat (1969) called for a cohesive and coordinated effort from 
the counterintelligence community to mitigate Soviet Intelligence from enabling 
communist forces in Vietnam.22  According to Matschulat, coordination translated to 
increased response capacity in the defeat of a foreign intelligence threat, namely, through 
increased cooperation among the military counterintelligence elements and those of the 
intelligence community. In addition to calls for greater cooperation, Matschulat also 
referred to the tendency of USCI to derive its structure and function from the activities of 
the chief adversary vice any other factor.23  If this holds true today, what structure and 
functions has the counterintelligence community developed to effectively combat the 
national cyberthreat? The exploration of this question will take place in Chapter IV of 
this thesis.  
2. Definitional Problems of Counterintelligence 
Review of the literature on counterintelligence points to an abundance of 
information that defines the defensive mission of counterintelligence. Bruneau and Boraz 
(2006) offer a succinct definition of counterintelligence that has been generally accepted 
within the scholarly community as “the protection of the state and its secrets against other 
states or organizations.”24  A virtual cornucopia of literature defines how this goal of 
counterintelligence is executed, but the preponderance of this literature deals with 
defensive counterintelligence activities. Defensive activities are those that dissuade, 
investigate, analyze, or harden targets to prevent a Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) 
from committing espionage. 
A cross section of these defensive works includes descriptions by Churchill and 
Wall (2001)25 of FBI investigations into dissident groups ranging from communist 
sympathizers in the 1950s to the solidarity movement in the 1980s. Contemporary 
                                                 
22 Austin Matschulat, “Coordination and Cooperation in Counterintelligence,” Studies in Intelligence 
13, no. 2 (spring 1969), 25–36. 
23 Ibid., 1. 
24 Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz, “Democracy and Effectiveness,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 
3 (July 2006), 30.  
25 Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, The Cointelpro Papers: Documents from the FBI’s Secret 
Wars Against Dissent in the United States (Boston: South End Press, November 2001), 1–500. 
 10
investigative literature includes Masco (2002)26 and Goodman (2005)27 who deal with 
the political sensitivities of counterespionage investigations. Additionally, a large 
grouping of case studies has been published that detail the espionage investigations of 
Jonathan Pollard, Robert Hanssen, Aldrich Ames and Ana Montes, to name but a few. 
These defense-centric works dominate proactive writings within counterintelligence 
literature. In doing do, they substantially reduce the range of professional discourse 
regarding the role of counterintelligence in protecting the national interest. 
For the dialogue on counterintelligence to be complete, it cannot be viewed by the 
scholar, professional, or national security decision maker as simply a reactive effort to 
uncover the damage done by FIS penetrations. The lack of literature dealing with the 
offensive counterintelligence mission (OFCO), therefore, results in a misinformed 
understanding of counterintelligence’s role for mitigating foreign intelligence threats. The 
DoD Joint Publication 1–02 (2012) defines two types of OFCO operations as double 
agent and controlled source operations.28  However, misunderstandings about OFCO still 
occur. Illustrating this point was a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) briefing, in which 
an OFCO unit had been stood up within the Defense Counterintelligence and Human 
Intelligence Center (DCHC). During a question and answer period with the media, such 
misunderstandings were highlighted when questions were posed about OFCO techniques 
that included targeted assassination of foreign intelligence officers.29   
Despite such misunderstandings, there is general consensus within the literature 
that USCI needs to focus on offensive counterintelligence as a means to mitigate foreign 
 
                                                 
26 Joseph Masco, “Lie Detectors: On Secrets and Hypersecurity in Los Alamos,” Public Culture 14, 
no. 3 (fall 2002), 441–467. 
27 Michael Goodman, “Who Is Trying to Keep What Secret from Whom and Why? MI5-FBI 
Relations and the Klaus Fuchs Case,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 3 (summer 2005), 124–146. 
28 United States Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 1–02: Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms” (Washington D.C.: 15 March 2012), 238. 
29 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Media Roundtable about the Establishment of the Defense 
Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center” (Washington, DC: Federal News Service, 5 August 
2008). 
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intelligence threats. Michelle Van Cleave (2007),30 the WMD Report (2005),31 and the 
National Counterintelligence Strategies of the United States (2005, 2008, 2009)32 have all 
called for USCI to place an emphasis on offensive operations. Van Cleave (2005), the 
former National Counterintelligence Executive from 2003–2006, indicates that such 
offensive based activities need to take place outside the United States on foreign soil. 33  
She also stated, “Ninety percent of our counterintelligence resources are concentrated 
within the United States. We’re playing goal-line defense rather than looking for 
opportunities to get ahead of the game.”34  She is not alone, the WMD Report (2005)35 
and the DIA DCHC announcement (2008)36 echo her sentiments. Moreover, the need for 
increased offensive capacity is not confined only toward the mitigation of traditional 
threats. Translated toward the evolved cyberespionage threat, Brenner (2011) describes 
one type of offensive counterintelligence action that would seek to “live inside our 
adversaries networks before they launch attacks against us.”37  His comments are an 
adaptation of Lin (2011) who sought to describe a means by which offensive action could 
support defensive purposes. Lin suggested the early warning of an incoming cyberattack 
could be developed from living inside advisories networks.38  Thus, there is consensus 
                                                 
30 Michelle Van Cleave, “Counterintelligence and National Strategy,” National Defense University: 
School for National Security Executive Education (April 2007), 11. 
31 U.S. Congress, “Chapter Eleven Counterintelligence,” 487. 
32 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “The National Counterintelligence Strategy 
of the United States of America” (2005); Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “The 
National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America” (2008); Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive, “The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of 
America” (2009).  
33 Michelle Van Cleave, “Foreign Spies Are Serious. Are We?” The Washington Post (8 February 
2009). 
34 Ibid. 
35 U.S. Congress, “Chapter Eleven Counterintelligence,” 486. 
36 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Media Roundtable about the Establishment of the Defense 
Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center.” 
37 Joel Brenner, America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, Crime 
and Warfare (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 216. 
38 Herbert Lin, “Understanding Cyberattack as an Instrument of U.S. Policy,” Presentation at the 
Council on Foreign Relations (New York City, NY: 9 May 2011), 9, 
<http://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/Lin_UnderstandingCyberattack.pdf> (28 May 2012). 
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regarding the need to generally increase offensive capabilities for a more effective 
counterintelligence enterprise and as a means to mitigate the cyberespionage threat.  
3. The Need to Restructure 
a. Contemporary Focus on Fragmentation 
Just as past scholars addressed the fragmented state of counterintelligence 
within the United States, current scholarship agrees that USCI is mired in stove-pipes and 
too fragmented to be effective. Van Cleave (2007),39 Brenner (2007),40 the WMD Report 
(2005),41 and Taylor (2007)42 all echo this sentiment. On the issue of stove-piping, these 
sources define a USCI enterprise comprised primarily of the three organizations with 
operational counterintelligence responsibilities; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the DoD. Brenner (2011) expands the 
definition of the USCI enterprise to one that comprises all seventeen members of the U.S. 
intelligence community.43  His distinction recognizes that all members of the IC have 
internal defensive authorities to investigate insider threats and to implement security 
methods to minimize exposure to foreign intelligence services. However, not all IC 
members have the authority to run offensive operations against a FIS. Expanding the 
definition of the USCI enterprise in this regard further illuminates the stove-piping issue.   
Consolidating opinion regarding a fractured USCI community, the NCIX 
Fundamentals of CI Report (2006) indicated that fragmentation within the 
counterintelligence community has resulted in duplication of effort, uneven performance 
in the workplace and unmet training requirements.
44  These symptoms are in agreement 
                                                 
39 Van Cleave, “Counterintelligence and National Strategy,” 1. 
40 Brenner, “Strategic Counterintelligence,” 30. 
41 U.S. Congress, “Chapter Eleven Counterintelligence,” 485. 
42 Stan Taylor, “Definitions and Theories of Counterintelligence,” in Loch Johnson, ed., Strategic 
Intelligence 4: Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 
2007). 
43 Brenner, “Joel Brenner, of Counsel: Biography.”  
44 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “Fundamental elements of the 
Counterintelligence discipline: Universal Counterintelligence Core competencies,” vol. 1 (The National 
Counterintelligence Institute: January 2006), 3. 
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with other literature that further defines the lack of effectiveness within USCI. Recent 
scholarship on the topic of restructuring therefore echoes the words written by 
Geschwind. Van Cleave (2007) issued similar charges for the need to restructure USCI. 
She calls the adoption of a case-by-case approach for dealing with the foreign 
intelligence threat and the practice of concentrating counterintelligence resources inside 
the United States vice engaging FIS abroad as tantamount to “ceding advantage to the 
enemy.”45 
b. Macro vs. Micro-Restructuring 
A professional intelligence community with a long tradition of intelligence 
work does not guarantee effectiveness.46  As such, the USCI community has recognized 
the need to restructure in order to deal with effectiveness; however, a key problem that 
remains is the divergent viewpoints regarding the method that such restructuring should 
follow. Large-scale Goldwater-Nichols style restructuring has been the favored 
government reform model. This style of reform is also evident in the National Security 
Act of 1947, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (which 
created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence) and the creation of the Office 
of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), whose mission is to lead an 
integrated national counterintelligence effort against foreign intelligence threats to the 
United States.47   
These major reform efforts have had both intended and unintended 
consequences. Intended results include increases in capacity and effectiveness,  
but such reform efforts also lead to the unintentional creation of additional layers of 
bureaucracy. Generally, major structural reforms have proven to have little effect in 
addressing a fragmented counterintelligence community. This is due to the fact that 
counterintelligence at the enterprise level derives its mission priorities from various 
                                                 
45 Van Cleave, “Counterintelligence and National Strategy,” 1. 
46 Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence, 20. 
47 This is the mission statement of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. The 
ONICX website can be found at, http://www.ncix.gov/about.php (accessed 4/25/12). 
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government agencies and departments.48  Thus, counterintelligence—more than perhaps 
any other government function—remains unaffected by the positive aspects that such 
reform brings. The New Institutionalist framework used to evaluate this concept indicates 
that the impetus for large-scale CI reform from both the legislative and executive 
perspective lacks political support. Counterintelligence’s lack of an effective domestic 
constituency in this regard is a contributing factor for continued fragmentation and 
subsequent lack of effectiveness.   
Even when an exogenous event would otherwise compel reform, such 
events have little impact on compelling reform within the counterintelligence community. 
The 9/11 Commission Report included an analysis of the operational and conceptual 
failings of the IC and counterintelligence community to detect and prevent the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks.49  Thus, even when USCI is found negligent, Congress fails to 
hold the community accountable by mandating a restructuring process to remove stove-
pipes or create the unity of effort mandated by the 9/11 Commission Report.50  
Additionally, large-scale public espionage cases against spies like Robert Hanssen, 
Aldrich Ames, John Anthony Walker, etc., do not result in a public outcry for reform. 
These cases show the lack of constituent interest produces a negligible amount of 
congressional and executive attention, which reduces action by these leaders to 
meaningless grand standing in an attempt to appear like statesmen.51   
The reason for this lack of accountability is twofold. One, there is a 
general aversion in the United States to a domestic intelligence agency similar to the 
British MI-5 model, which is seen as incompatible to an American democracy concerned 
                                                 
48 Van Cleave, “Foreign Spies Are Serious. Are We?.” 
49 William Lahneman, “U.S. Intelligence Prior to 9/11 and Obstacles to Reform,” in Bruneau and 
Boraz, Reforming Intelligence, 77. 
50 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
“Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 107th Congress, 2nd Session” 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 2002), 399. 
51 Zegart, Flawed by Design, 215.  
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with the protection of civil liberties and effective oversight.52  Secondarily, the 
congressional action model suggests that Congress has little incentive to tackle issues that 
do not meet the demands of a particular interest group or those that otherwise directly 
impact their constituents. While counterintelligence cases may stir the passions of the 
American populace, they in and of themselves do not represent a specific constituency by 
which a congressional representative can be held accountable for failing to enact 
legislation or reform that creates a more effective USCI community.53   
Large-scale—macro-style—restructuring of government is best described 
by Locher (2002), which details the last successful major overhaul of the Defense 
Department under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GWN). 
Locher indicated that such macro-style reform required the perfect alignment of political, 
media and public support, and that the alignment of these factors normally requires an 
exogenous event.54  Zegart (2009) adds an important analysis of restructuring in general 
as she describes the permanency of intelligence bureaucracies once they have been 
established, regardless of such an exogenous event.55  She further adds that even when 
major reorganizations of national security agencies occur, they have a low success rate 
for achieving greater effectiveness.56  This analysis underscores the need for a micro-
approach to restructuring. Such an approach was introduced by Bachman (2011) who 
recommended the integration of DoD OFCO capabilities between NCIS and AFOSI 
using their relocation to a joint headquarters in Quantico, VA, as a catalyst.57  Such a 
recommendation is “micro,” in that it does not necessitate congressional approval of 
large-scale capital investment.  
                                                 
52 James Burch, “A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States? A Comparative Analysis of 
Domestic Intelligence Agencies and Their Implications for Homeland Security,” Homeland Security 
Affairs, vol. iii, no. 2 (June 2007), 1. 
53 Zegart, Flawed by Design, 102. 
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(College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2002), 15–32. 
55 Zegart, Flawed by Design, 227.  
56 Ibid., 234. 
57 Gregory J. Bachman, “Integrating Defense Counterintelligence: A First Step,” Georgetown Public 
Policy Institute: Capstone Paper (Georgetown University, 25 April 2011), 1–29. 
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G. MICRO-RESTRUCTURING AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL 
The general hypothesis developed to this point places a counterintelligence reform 
impetus on a micro-restructuring model. Such a model would not require the large-scale 
political capital needed during a GWN style reorganization and could be 
interdepartmentally focused. Such restructuring omits the need for Congressional 
approval and thus circumvents the two reasons for congressional inaction mentioned 
previously. Accordingly, DoD owns four of the six operational counterintelligence 
elements within the U.S. government and it has the authority to restructure its own 
components, as it deems necessary by issuing DoD Directives.  
The other hypothesis developed from this research is that within the United 
States, the mitigation of the cyberthreats—independent of cyberwar—is primarily a law 
enforcement and security function. This supposition builds upon the decades old 
understanding of counterintelligence as an inherently governmental function.58  Brought 
into the contemporary environment, this understanding appears supported by initiatives 
lead by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for implementing The National 
Cybersecurity Strategy and investigative authority for financially motivated cybercrime 
with the U.S. Secret Service. While DHS is tasked as the coordination authority for 
mitigating vulnerability of critical infrastructure inside the United States, the law 
enforcement role for reducing cyberespionage outside the United States appears limited.   
In lieu of a consolidated federal law enforcement response to these activities, 
USCYBERCOM has largely absorbed the responsibility for mitigating such threats. This 
is principally due to the co-location of USCYBERCOM with the NSA and a subsequent 
capacity to mitigate cyberthreats that is unmatched by other agencies in the federal 
government.59  This research does not make the claim that USCYBERCOM’s role in 
mitigating such actions is incorrect; rather, it asserts that the mitigation of hostile cyber 
activity is a young endeavor and as such, addressing cyberespionage outside the United 
                                                 
58 A.C. Wasemiller, “The Anatomy of Counterintelligence,” Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 1 (winter 
1969), 10. 
59 Paul Rosenzweig, “10 Consecutive Principles for Cybersecurity Policy,” The Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder, no. 2513 (Washington, D.C.: 2011). 
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States should evolve to incorporate the existing authorities that govern espionage writ 
large. The counterintelligence community must not abandon its responsibility to 
offensively target such activates outside the United States simply because it does not 
have the cyber expertise resonant within USCYBERCOM.   
Addressing this imbalance indicates that USCYBERCOM—while well suited in 
the technical realm—does not maintain an optic from which to fully employ a host of 
offensively derived techniques in the mitigation of espionage. This research therefore, 
determines that the mitigation of all forms of espionage is an inherently law enforcement 
and governmental function and one that the USCI enterprise would be more effective at 
countering through a micro-restructuring approach that places an emphasis on domestic 
partnerships within DoD. Such partnerships would include increased USCI presence at 
USCYBERCOM in a fusion center approach to offensively combat cyberespionage by 
DoD’s service counterintelligence components (NCIS, AFOSI, Army CI and DIA 
DCHC). In turn, the development and sustainment of such relationships would become a 
force multiplier for USCYBERCOM, as it would enable full spectrum capacity for 
dealing with cyberespionage and cyberattack within one institution.   
H. MICRO-RESTRUCTURING AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL: DOD 
AND ALLIES 
The National Counterintelligence Strategy (2009)60 specifically addressed the 
need to integrate counterintelligence with all aspects of cyberspace stating, “we must 
strengthen collaboration among policy makers, law enforcement, counterintelligence 
elements, security and other key players across the U.S. government on cyber 
operations”61, but this list specifically leaves out international partnerships as an element 
in combating the cyberthreat. Despite the lack of a current counterintelligence strategy 
that addresses international cyber cooperation, the 2011 National Security Council 
Cyberspace Policy Review does address the need for international cooperation. 
                                                 
60 The 2009 strategy document is the most recently published National Counterintelligence Strategy. 
61 National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2009, vi. 
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Furthermore, it specifically advises the United States government to work with 
international bodies, military allies and intelligence partners who face similar threats.62   
There is a consensus in the literature regarding the necessity of the international 
community to cooperate on cybersecurity. This is seen through multinational 
collaborative events like the semi-annual DHS sponsored Cyber Storm exercise63 and 
recommendations by Schreier, Weeks and Winkler (2011)64 for international support in 
constructing regimes and institutions that develop norms by which cybersecurity can be 
addressed. Calls for such international regimes have been echoed by international 
decision makers as well, as was observed at the London Conference on Cyberspace 
through comments made by British Foreign Secretary William Hague (2011).65  
It is assessed that increased international cyber engagement is a fundamental 
method by which to curtail hostile cyber activity. However, the degree of actual 
cooperation in the international environment appears subject to discussion vice action. 
Actionable responses for reducing cyberespionage and cyberattack appear limited to 
traditional allies. In the case of the United States, this level of cooperation became 
evident in the shaping of the 2012 Cyber Storm exercise, which will only include 
participation from the current cyber trifecta that includes the United States, Australia and 
the United Kingdom.66  While there are clearly policy and security concerns in 
broadening cooperation beyond America’s traditional allies, this research seeks to fill a 
knowledge gap regarding the decision making framework by which national security 
leaders judge such engagement.   
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All states share a preponderance of America’s vulnerabilities in cyberspace and at 
times are threatened by the same actors. U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in the cyber arena is 
particularly well suited to meet the demands of the National Intelligence Strategy as both 
nations are highly impacted by illicit cyber activity derived within the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC).67  Furthermore, inside the U.S. government, DoD arguably maintains the 
best diplomatic channels with the Taiwanese national security establishment. Leveraging 
these relationships with Taiwan could provide much needed liaison intelligence to 
counter the cyberthreat under Title 50 (intelligence); but more specifically, this research 
seeks to determine how this could be accomplished under Title 18 (criminal). Taiwan 
therefore, becomes a poignant case study by which further international cooperation can 
be gauged. What would law enforcement liaison and increased cooperation between the 
United States and Taiwan look like, and what are the political implications by which it 
would be constrained? 
As law enforcement liaison is conducted under Title 18 vice Title 50, the secrecy 
burdens are lessened. This is not to suggest that information is shared outside DoD’s 
approval channels, but rather and only, that law enforcement liaison is sometimes a more 
effective means of developing the initial mechanisms needed to explore such issues in 
larger detail. Restructuring DoD counterintelligence at the international level to leverage 
Taiwanese resources could provide a significant advantage to the U.S. counterintelligence 
enterprise and to the DoD. This research seeks to explore those advantages to determine 
the various issues for and against the development of such partnerships.   
I. CONCLUSION  
The research conducted for this thesis determined that small ground-up 
institutional changes within DoD law enforcement counterintelligence organizations can 
improve the effectiveness of the USCI enterprise as it seeks to combat and ultimately 
mitigate the national cyberthreat. This research took a dual track approach to derive its 
final conclusions. One such approach showed that domestic level micro-restructuring 
focused toward mitigating cyberespionage will streamline resources and produce an 
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effective level of counterintelligence within the Department of Defense. Secondarily, 
international restructuring placed a focus on developing a closer liaison relationship with 
Taiwan, principally as it relates to mitigating cyberespionage, but also as it pertains to the 
larger issue of cybersecurity.   
Apart from increasing domestic cooperation among DoD counterintelligence 
elements to streamline effectiveness, such restructuring also affords the national security 
apparatus an avenue to address the challenging fiscal environment. The stove-piped 
nature of counterintelligence in the United States produces redundancy, waste and 
overlap of mission authorities and financial resources. Unlike the military services, which 
have the preponderance of their yearly appropriations tied up in weapons and weapons 
systems, taxpayer dollars spent on counterintelligence is invested primarily in the training 
and retention of personnel through salaries.  
 Minimizing the redundancy between agencies—especially those agencies that 
fall under the same executive department—should therefore be considered a best practice 
in an era of fiscal restraint and heightened fiscal responsibility. Instituting a micro-
restructuring approach for DoD CI agencies is an approach in effective reform that 
addresses redundancies within the counterintelligence enterprise and improves 
effectiveness of counterintelligence while adhering to efficiency concerns. Should such a 
micro-restructuring approach be proven successful, it could pave the way for broader 
restructuring across the counterintelligence enterprise. Clearly the external threat to 
American national security from cyberespionage demands nothing less. 
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II. CYBERESPIONAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CHINESE 
CYBERTHREAT 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to assess the role that cybersecurity plays in the U.S. national 
security establishment. It begins by exploring the foundation upon which current 
cyberthreats thrive; including the emerged role that cyberespionage has upon a state’s 
capacity for intelligence collection. Finally, this chapter explores the need for an evolved 
U.S. counterintelligence enterprise that effectively addresses increased FIS capacity to 
steal U.S. military technology and commercial secrets. 
B. WHAT IS CYBERESPIONAGE AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
The American military-industrial complex is the world’s fattest espionage 
target. While the scope and intensity of economic espionage have assumed 
startling proportions, the “traditional” espionage assault on our national 
defense establishment dwarfs anything we have ever before experienced.68  
In the above passage, Joel Brenner, the former National Counterintelligence 
Executive, is accurate to refer to the “traditional” espionage threat as one directed against 
the defense establishment. However, in this context the term “traditional” is somewhat 
misleading. While espionage still traditionally targets the defense establishment, its 
means of commission are certainly not traditional. The intelligence community assesses 
that the use of cyber tools to conduct economic espionage has become the preferred 
method for illicit intelligence collection.69  This prevalence has likely spread to the 
collection of sensitive commercial information and technology as well, producing a 
transformation in the commission of espionage in the modern era. The reason for this is 
quite clear. Espionage committed electronically is cheap, easy and low risk. 70  These 
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three factors are embedded within the modern cyber infrastructure and they act in concert 
to produce a mounting national security vulnerability. This shift is summarized as: 
Information that previously required close-in human intelligence 
(HUMINT) access, necessitating the long-term development and 
recruitment of individuals with access to targeted information, is now 
easily obtained by sending a phishing e-mail to the unsuspecting targets.71  
In today’s information environment, the exfiltration of intelligence that once took years 
and involved the development of substantial human intelligence networks can be 
accomplished in a matter of minutes in one download session.72  Cyberespionage has 
revolutionized the intelligence collection business and the American counterintelligence 
enterprise must respond in kind.  
In the current cyberspace environment, sophisticated cyber capabilities reside 
almost exclusively with nation-states.73  State sponsored hostile cyber activity generally 
includes support to espionage operations, reconnaissance of military networks using 
sensors or “sleeper” tools for later use during a conflict, theft of commercial data or 
intellectual property and sometimes demonstrating capabilities that deter rival states.74  
Instances of these hostile events continue to grow at an alarming rate and each new 
incident is a lesson in the vulnerability of American power. William Lynn, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, while unveiling the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, 
identified the most prevalent of these hostile cyberthreats as computer network 
exploitation (CNE). He summarizes CNE as “the [cyber derived] theft of information and 
intellectual property from government and commercial networks.”75 The most significant 
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cases of CNE to date have included Google’s Aurora incident, Titan Rain, Ghost Net, 
Shady Rat and the RSA-Lockheed Martin incident.  
The research contained in this thesis does not attempt to amplify the details of 
these cases; in fact, much has already been written on their relevance to include the 
damage they have collectively caused to American national security.76  Rather, more 
relevant to this debate is how their combined impact has led U.S. policymakers to make 
several important judgments. Primarily, that cyberspace presents new and unique 
challenges to the protection of American economic, industrial and military secrets; and 
secondarily, “[a] large body of both circumstantial and forensic evidence strongly 
indicates Chinese state involvement in such activities, whether through the direct actions 
of state entities or through the actions of third-party groups sponsored by the state.”77  
While it is no surprise that cyber powerhouses like China and Russia view themselves as 
strategic competitors of the United States, they are also the most aggressive collectors of 
U.S. economic information and technology.78  The non-traditional use of cyberspace as a 
new medium in which states can conduct espionage activity prevents a grave challenge to 
the U.S. counterintelligence community.   
C. THE COST OF CYBERESPIONAGE 
The true cost of cyberespionage remains elusive—costs measured in terms of 
economic deprivation and loss of technical military dominance—although it is clear that 
the transfer of cutting edge military technology to America’s adversaries endangers the 
lives of U.S. military personal and strengthens the resolve of those nations who wish to 
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thwart American political objectives.79  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
released a March 2012 report that listed the aggregated year-on-year portfolio value of 
the top 96 military acquisition programs at $1.58 trillion.80  When these programs are 
compromised, their aggregate value drops dramatically as adversary nations are able to 
develop both countermeasures to these systems—based on knowledge of how they 
work—and replicate them for use in their own arsenals. These losses produce enormous 
economic opportunity costs for the United States financially and degrade the technical 
military advantage they are intended to convey. Raising the political cost for nations that 
commit cyberespionage therefore becomes a means to curtail such activity while 
strengthening the American economy and a defense establishment. 
In the private sector, the theft of trade secrets from U.S. companies “undermines 
the corporate sector’s ability to create jobs, generate revenues, foster innovation and lay 
the economic foundation for prosperity and national security.”81  American power has 
always been the byproduct of a stable and healthy wealth generating capitalist system. In 
the contemporary environment, the linkage between the private sector and government 
has officially dissolved as the boundary between economic security and national security 
has disappeared.82  Addressing the national security of the United States requires the 
protection of corporate intellectual property and cutting-edge military technology in the 
face of cyberespionage threats. 
The speed of technical innovation coupled with an increased global reliance upon 
technology makes threats from cyberspace the most serious contemporary security 
challenge faced by the state. Cybercriminals, patriotic hackers and even the intelligence 
establishments of most states have found reduced risk and increased opportunity due to 
the difficulty of positive attribution. This global challenge requires effective legislation, 
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international agreements, established norms and enforcement mechanisms to adequately 
mitigate cybersecurity challenges in the modern world. Of these threats, 
cyberespionage—as an advanced form of state sponsored cyber intelligence collection—
poses a significant threat to the American national security establishment.   
Espionage in general reduces the power advantages enjoyed by the United States 
afforded through its dominance in economic, industrial and advanced military 
technology. When coupled with the inherent properties of cyberspace such as speed, 
decreased risk and cost effectiveness, it is easy to see that cyberespionage is a new and 
all-encompassing threat to American power and way of life. 
D. THE THREAT FROM CHINA 
Military strategic planners in China have recognized the geopolitical value of 
cyberpower, specifically as it relates to a new form of warfare. People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) Air Force Senior Colonels, Wang Xiangsui and Qiao Liang, published a definitive 
book on the subject of asymmetric warfare, of which they include cyberwarfare as a 
revolutionizing means of conducting war in the modern era. While their analysis 
generally includes the ways and means to mitigate U.S. military dominance, it also 
provides important insight into Chinese decision-making.   
Wang and Qiao advocate the development of cyber capabilities that are intended 
to paralyze and undermine potential adversaries, but not to produce casualties.83  Their 
conclusions come from the recognition that American weapon systems are completely 
reliant on technology, and that cyberweapons can become a cost effective way to equalize 
a high-tech battlefield environment. In an economic context, their strategic decision to 
advance the use of cyberweapons is one of necessity rather than choice. They recognize 
the financial cost of developing new weapon systems constrains China’s ability to 
compete in a high-tech battlespace. Their solution therefore is the development of a 
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robust cyberwarfare capability that not only levels the playing field, but also acts as a 
deterrent for American decisions to project military power.84  They write: 
[T]echnological progress has given us the means to strike at the enemy’s 
nerve center directly without harming other things, giving us numerous 
new options for achieving victory, and all these make people believe the 
best way to achieve victory is to control, not to kill.85  
For these Chinese strategic planners, future wars will be network wars. Wars that will 
likely involve no bloodshed, but be capable of determining the overall victor before 
kinetic weapons are employed.86  However, Chinese strategic planning in this regard 
goes further than just classifying cyberattack as a means to conduct warfare, there is also 
a clandestine usage argument in their remarks.   
For these strategic planners, the battlefield itself is no longer limited strictly to the 
traditional units of tanks, soldiers and large standing armies. As such, the modern 
battlefield also includes the cyber infrastructures of an opposing state, infrastructure that 
can be targeted and destroyed clandestinely if needed. This point is clarified in their own 
words, “the battlefield is omnipresent. Just think, if it’s even possible to start a war in a 
computer room or stock exchange that will send an enemy country to its doom, then is 
there non-battlespace anywhere?”87  While these writings may be intended to mislead as 
well as deceive the American national security decision maker, it is important to observe 
that their strategic thinking has been adopted by the current group of power holders in 
China. Evidence suggests that these decisions makers are primarily concerned with 
strategy and planning that seeks to neutralize a stronger and more powerful enemy.   
A June 2011 article of the CCP newspaper Youth Daily (Qingnian Bao) notes that 
“the quantity of military intelligence information obtained over the Internet is large, the 
classification level is high, the information is timely and the cost is low, intelligence 
reconnaissance activities that are launched over the Internet are already omnipresent and 
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are extremely difficult to defend against.”88  As such, the value of understanding the 
progression of Chinese decision making with regards to cyberspace lies with the 
knowledge that Chinese strategy seeks to exploit the weakness inherent within the 
interconnected networks that drive the modern American military machine. David 
Shambaugh clarifies this point in his book Modernizing China’s Military, “PLA 
strategists are convinced that they must fight the United States in ways that negate 
comparative American advantages while exploiting relative weaknesses.”89  It is the 
targeting of American military networks that they seek to exploit as a means to mitigate 
U.S. military advantage. These networks must therefore be made secure in the effort to 
assure America’s ability to protect its national interest.   
E. CHINA’S CYBER CAPACITY BUILDUP: TRANSITIONING FROM 
THEORY TO CAPABILITY 
China’s general lack of transparency with its military modernization obfuscates 
any assessment of its cyberwarfare capabilities. That said, there are certain aspects along 
the path of China’s progression from strategic theory to the development of tangible 
cyber capacities under the auspices of the PLA that can be explored. PLA units are being 
trained and mobilized to “expand the types of targets or objectives for armed conflict to 
command and control systems, communications systems and infrastructure.”90  Strategic 
theory meets preparation at this juncture, where the PLA cyber units are staffed, trained 
and mobilized to support the totality of CNE, CND and CNA operations. The PLA unit 
established to conduct these activates has assumed the name “Online Blue Army.”   
Analysts are astute to point out that the term “Online Blue Army” was actually 
derived from a misconception on behalf of the media. In China opposition forces are 
given the term “Blue Army,” and a media reference to a war game involving a cyber-
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opposition force led to the misclassification of the unit as an “Online Blue Army.” 
Independent of the names origin is the fact that this name has come to represent China’s 
CYBERCOM equivalent.91  With the title well entrenched within the Chinese and 
Western media, the “Blue Army’s” mission has been described as ensuring the security of 
China’s military networks, protecting China’s economic development and maintaining 
social stability.92  While these acknowledgements confirm the establishment of a PLA 
cyber component, they do not address the means by which the unit seeks to achieve its 
goals, or how it is situated within the PLA’s command structure.   
On July 19, 2010, the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) unveiled the 
Information Support Base (ISB), which Western analysts have determined to be similar 
in scope and mission to USCYBERCOM. The ISB has been tasked to deal with 
cyberthreats and safeguarding China’s national security.93  Further structural revelations 
have determined the PLA GSD Third Department and Fourth Department to be the two 
largest players in China’s burgeoning cyber infrastructure.94  Of these two departments, 
the Third Department has assumed the responsibility for assuring the security of PLA 
computer systems in order to prevent access to sensitive national security information.95  
Additionally, the Third Department is the PLA’s recognized signals intelligence 
command; and as such, it can be assessed that the Third Department is also responsible 
for coordinating China’s CNE capabilities and its cyberespionage activities.  
While the strength of China’s cyber command component remains elusive and 
will most likely remain so as a means to create deterrent value, it is reported that the unit 
relies on a PLA “cyber militia” that uses private sector experience to improve upon the 
unit’s CNE capabilities.96 Specifically. this analysis indicates that China’s cyber 
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command is supplemented by part-time citizens in both the academic and commercial 
sectors. While the veracity of such an alignment is oblique, it is important to note that 
China’s cyber capabilities are not hindered from a lack of talent or experience. Chinese 
military experts attempt to obfuscate this fact by indicating that its online military 
capacity is still in a “fledging state” when compared with those of Western nations.97  In 
contrast, a more subjective analysis indicates that China’s strategic direction is in favor of 
offensive cyber capabilities as seen through the development of a military command 
structure. This points to an offensive cyber capability that is larger and more defined than 
what the Chinese state is willing to acknowledge.   
The People’s Republic of China is regarded by many to be a grave threat to the 
United States with the capability and motivation to collect against the most sensitive and 
classified of U.S. information and technology.98  However, it is important to clarify that 
culpability of the Chinese state in the commission of hostile cyber activities directed 
against the United States remains unproven. U.S. policy and analysis documents that 
disclose the Chinese cyberthreat are always astute to address this fact. Yet, the lack of a 
“smoking gun” does not negate the importance of circumstantial evidence in the 
production of American policy or an effective counterintelligence structure to investigate, 
harden against and deter hostile cyber activity derived within the PRC. 
F. THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, WHAT DOES IT TELL US? 
An unsubstantiated U.S. State Department report uncovered in the wake of the 
Google’s Aurora incident claims that the order to initiate the operation was given from 
within the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.99  The evidence for this 
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allegation appears to come from a single source, making it circumstantial at best and false 
at worst. However, nearly all other incidents that detail public knowledge of Chinese 
state-directed cyberespionage include similar claims of circumstantial evidence. In 
February 2012, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) inspector 
general testified before Congress that in the previous year NASA had sustained 47 
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT)—a term used to indicate a level of cyberattack that 
involves a well-resourced and skilled attacker, the term is usually reserved to indicate 
state activity—13 of which had successfully compromised NASA networks. The most 
significant of these attacks were traced back to a Chinese-based Internet Protocol (IP) 
address and included the penetration of NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). The 
attackers gained full access to JPL’s computer systems and sensitive user accounts, 
allowing them full functional control of the network.100   
In light of the NASA JPL incident, it is important to clarify that circumstantial 
evidence relying on IP addresses resolving to China do not necessarily prove a 
meaningful connection to the Chinese government. Rather, more powerful analysis for 
determining CCP complicity resides with the nature of the information sought from 
exploitation. This analysis has led an Assistant U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense to state: 
When looking across the intrusions of the last few years...a great deal of it 
concerns our most sensitive systems, including aircraft avionics, 
surveillance technologies, satellite communications systems, and network 
security protocols. The cyber exploitation being perpetrated against the 
defense industry cuts across a wide swath of crucial military hardware, 
extending from missile tracking systems and satellite navigation devices to 
UAVs and the Joint Strike Fighter.101 
Circumstantial evidence indicative of Chinese state involvement in the context framed 
above typically deals with the non-monetary value, or overall lack of a market value, for 
the secret defense related information stolen during such cyberespionage events.102  The 
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information typically compromised during these intrusions has little underground or 
criminal market value, as governments tend to be the dominant end-users or benefactors 
for such secret material and high-tech military grade technology. While this factor does 
not point empirically to China, it does suggest that a large state or states with significant 
military capacity is behind such hostile actions. This fact allows for analysis that 
indicates only a few states have the capacity and motivation to conduct cyberespionage. 
In other words, not all states have both an ability to implement stolen information into 
their own military weapon systems and the strategic outlook to produce an asymmetric 
means to balance against U.S. military dominance.   
Circumstantial evidence of state-directed hostile cyber activity seen through this 
optic predominantly points to China, Russia and Iran as the perpetrators that fit the above 
referenced model. While such analysis may be significant, it is not sufficient to induce 
the U.S. decision maker to accurately determine Chinese state involvement or 
accordingly develop policies that effectively aim to label China as a state sponsor of 
hostile cyber activity. Thus, a more concise understanding of state involvement is needed 
with regard to China. Such an understanding is properly attained through analysis of the 
motivations behind China’s current cyber capacity buildup. This examination changes the 
focus of the culpability debate as it places an imperative on the logical elements for state 
sponsorship rather than a search for the evidence. There are generally four accepted 
reasons for states to develop, maintain and utilize an aggressive cyber capability:  
1. For deterrent value, by infiltrating and demonstrating a capability to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of another state’s critical infrastructure.103 
2. For cyberespionage, aimed at producing classified plans or technology that makes 
it possible for states to advance their military development at increased speed.104 
3. For cyberespionage, to make economic gains through industrial espionage. This 
provides an economic advantage for the state’s commercial interests as they 
compete in the global economic system.105  
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4. For cyberwarfare, to degrade or paralyze an adversary’s military capacity.106  
Looking at China’s cyber capacity build-up through the lens of these four reasons leads to 
a logical conclusion that it is in China’s best interest to develop hostile cyber capabilities. 
Within international relations parlance, there is a generally accepted observance 
that China employs a defensive realist security strategy.107  China’s adherence to this 
model of international engagement necessitates that it refrain from offensive realist 
strategies, or those strategies that place an imperative on the accumulation of power at the 
cost of decreased relations with neighboring countries or cooperation in international 
agreements. China’s path toward defensive realism is dictated in part by its geographic 
location and the realization that if it were to choose offensive policies, its neighbors 
would easily be able to develop balance of power alliances to constrain PRC actions.108 
Thus, while China is forced to follow defensive realist polices that place a greater 
need for it to participate constructively in multilateral organizations, the development of 
offensive cyber capabilities does not jeopardize its defensive realist position. In other 
words, cyberpower remains a tool by which the Chinese state can maintain both a 
defensive realist posture while developing a strong offensive capability. Cyberpower’s 
non-attribution quality makes this possible. China’s position is strengthened by this 
aspect of cyberpower, for it does not truly have to demonstrate offensive capability but 
rather only the semblance of one. In this respect, Chinese involvement in hostile cyber 
activities simply becomes the rational expression of its security strategy.   
G. BREAKING DOWN CHINA’S CYBER CAPACITY: A CLOSER LOOK 
AT THE FOUR REASONS THAT STATES DEVELOP OFFENSIVE 
CYBER CAPABILITIES  
Looking closer at each of the four reasons that states develop aggressive cyber 
capabilities from the perspective of China’s national decision makers provides insight 
into the PRC’s cyber capacity. China appears mainly concerned with minimizing political 
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and military pressure from the United States.109  Developing and demonstrating a cyber 
capability to affect the critical infrastructure of the United States at a time of China’s 
choosing is thus a successful deterrent to American action. This forces U.S. decision 
makers to question Chinese capabilities and weigh the risk of their action against the 
possibility that China could shut down key elements of the nation’s critical infrastructure 
via cyberattack. However, for this capacity to be an effective deterrent it must be 
demonstrated with results that not only prove the vulnerability of American 
infrastructure, but also provide suspicion of Chinese state involvement. In other words, a 
clandestine capability alone would not be a deterrent; the capacity must be demonstrated 
and tied to the Chinese government at least through speculation. Is there evidence that 
this has occurred?  
In 2009, investigation revealed that an APT had installed software programs onto 
the cyber network that controls the U.S. electric grid. 110  The action proved significant 
for inducing U.S. decision makers to suspect that foreign states may have placed 
undetected backdoor control mechanisms within U.S. infrastructure networks. In this 
instance, the need to prove a capability to actually shut down the electric grid became 
minimized strictly by creating the perception that it might be possible. The 2009 
investigation into the electric grid network penetration prompted Joel Brenner, the 
National Counterintelligence Executive, to state, “we have seen Chinese network 
operations inside certain [elements] of our electricity grids.”111  These attacks point to a 
state sponsor and moreover, they appear intended to convey a deterrent effect on the use 
of American power. As such, the reason for China to conduct hostile cyber activities in 
support of the first reason listed above is quite clear; it creates an added capacity to deter 
American hegemonic pressure. 
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The second reason, using cyberespionage to gain military or technical 
information, can be seen in similar fashion. China’s military capabilities remain behind 
those of the West and will remain so for the foreseeable future.112  China realizes that it 
cannot outspend or out-innovate the United States when it comes to developing and 
fielding the military technology. Gaining access to such technology through espionage is 
therefore a force multiplier for China’s military modernization efforts, especially as 
cyberespionage has proven to be more effective, more affordable and less risky than 
traditional collection methods.113  Evidence that supports this supposition points to the 
October 2011 case involving RSA Security (RSA is a global leader in the development 
and service of high-end network encryption devices). In March 2011, RSA had its 
systems hacked and encryption algorithm stolen for its remote access authentication 
token. Both the RSA executive chairman and the analysts who have looked into the 
incident generally agree that the attack was state sponsored.114  RSA’s clients include 
Fortune 500 companies, government agencies and major defense contractors.   
The RSA breach consequently resulted in a cyberespionage exploitation attempt 
of Lockheed Martin’s secure network. This brought about speculation that the company’s 
secret data, which includes information on the F-22 and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, was 
compromised. Lockheed denied publically that any damage was done or information 
pilfered.115  However, it is known definitive that the attack on Lockheed and RSA was a 
multi-stage cyberespionage operation that included intense planning, reconnaissance and 
operational knowledge. 116  In addition to its complexity, the information sought 
pertained strictly to defense-related intellectual property on Lockheed’s two fifth-
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generation fighters.117  Such information points most decisively to state involvement. 
Only a handful of states have the capacity or intent to capitalize on such information.   
The third reason, involving cyberespionage for economic gain, can also be 
supported with analysis and case study. China’s general technological competency still 
lags behind the United States, which gives it an increased incentive to engage in 
industrial espionage to gain greater economic advantage.118  This is especially true given 
that the legitimacy of the Chinese Community Party (CCP) is increasingly tied to its 
ability to produce year-after-year economic growth. Even as the CCP attempts to develop 
other factors upon which to build legitimacy—namely societal stability and national 
unity—the true underpinning of legitimacy remains unimpeded economic growth.119  
This is evidenced by the manifestation of social unrest in China whenever the economy 
lags and through the large capital requirements needed to support national unity programs 
like the hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games. Economic growth alone and the 
maintenance of it, provides an abundance of incentive for the Chinese government, 
companies and sovereign investment funds to partake in economic espionage on a global 
scale. The transferral of this imperative to the cyberdomain is summarized as follows:  
During peacetime, computer network exploitation has likely become a 
cornerstone of PLA and civilian intelligence collection operations…[t]he 
apparent expansion of China’s computer network exploitation (CNE) 
activities to support espionage has opened rich veins of previously 
inaccessible information that can be mined both in support of national 
security concerns and, more significantly, for national economic 
development.120 
The fourth reason, developing a capacity to degrade the superior combat forces of 
a Western advisory (in effect to level the playing field), has already been explored 
through analysis of Wang and Qiao’s strategic and doctrinal suggestions. However, it is 
important to note how these strategic decisions have affected China’s modern military 
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build-up in terms of a real capacity. The creation of a Chinese Blue Army and the 
development of a command unit similar in scope and mission to USCYBERCOM, is the 
manifestation of Wang and Qiao’s strategic thinking in terms. The creation of an online 
army in this capacity is tantamount to the continued observance of balance of power 
strategy that has summarized Chinese foreign policy throughout modern history.121  In 
the context of its own security and the unipolar world order, China’s balance of power 
strategy cannot seek to traditionally balance with another state against U.S. cyberwarfare 
capabilities. As such, China seeks to balance American dominance of cyberspace with a 
buildup of its own cyberwarfare capability. In this process, China and the U.S. usher in a 
security dilemma with regard to cyberspace. The cyber capacity developments from both 
sides indicate any military conflict between the United States and China would include 
hostile cyber activates during all phases of the conflict. 
H. CONCLUSION  
Discovering evidence of Chinese state involvement within the various instances 
of hostile cyber activity directed at the United States is not necessary to determine the 
courses of action available to the U.S. decision maker with regard to bolstering 
America’s cyber defense and offensive capabilities. Several defensive initiatives are 
already in the works, to include the deployment of robust intrusion detection systems like 
EINSTEIN 2 and EINSTEIN 3 (systems established by DHS to monitor network activity 
on government computers and provide real-time alerts on unauthorized access and 
malicious activity).122  However, in a rapidly changing environment like cybersecurity, 
defensive systems alone are not adequate to effectively protect against or deter 
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cyberthreats. The national decision maker is consequently faced with the need to develop 
effective defensive alternatives, and such methods include expanded offensive 
capabilities.   
Unfortunately, both offensive and defensive capabilities take time to develop. 
General Keith Alexander, Commander U.S. CYBERCOM, addressed this concept with 
Congress in 2010: 
In the cyberdomain, however, we are just beginning to craft new doctrine 
and tactics, techniques, and procedures…we are developing doctrine for a 
pro-active, agile cyber force that can “maneuver” in cyberspace at the 
speed of the Internet; and we are looking at the ways in which adversaries 
might seek to exploit our weaknesses.123   
Addressing the timely development of proactive-offensive capacities can generally 
include greater integration of offensive counterintelligence capabilities that are currently 
available to the strategic decision maker. In fact, the concept of a government-wide cyber 
counterintelligence plan was addressed by President Obama’s Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative.124  Addressing this need employs the concept that realigning the 
U.S. counterintelligence enterprise with authorities and structures to immediately benefit 
the offensive cyber mission is a crucial first step in addressing a whole of government 
approach to cybersecurity.   
Finally, as a realist actor within the international system, China has much to gain 
by developing and partaking in cyberespionage, computer network exploitation and the 
development of a cyberwar capability directed at the United States. In this vein, the U.S. 
decision maker does not have to wait for a smoking gun of evidence to take steps that 
will improve upon the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. national security 
establishment to plan for and mitigate these attacks. A large part of this process is to 
recognize that the U.S. counterintelligence enterprise has a large role to play in the 
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development of these capabilities, and that its cyber elements need to be effectively 
organized to best impact its mission. While the goal of this thesis is to prove that this 
capability increase is warranted, in an effort to explore the other options available to the 
decision maker, one must look at the possibility for international agreements to limit the 
damage to American national security as well. The next chapter is dedicated to an 
exploration of the international options that are currently on the table. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE 
CYBERSPACE: LESSONS FROM ESTONIA 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter assesses the international community’s attempt to regulate 
cyberspace as a means to limit hostile cyber activity within the international system. It 
uses the 2007 cyberattack against Estonia to develop a working foundation that will be 
used to assess the fundamental issues effecting cybersecurity. This foundation is then 
used to analyze the implications for a variety of international regulatory mechanisms 
proposed by scholars, international institutions and states. In analyzing these existing and 
proposed international mechanisms, this chapter determines that effective mitigation is 
neither guaranteed nor achievable in the short term. As a means to assess the American 
national security decision maker’s options for effective mitigation of the national 
cyberespionage threat, this chapter concludes after exploring the drawbacks of these 
proposals and determining the need for more timely and effective measures for 
cyberthreat mitigation.  
B. CYBERSPACE: THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT OF CYBERWAR, 
CYBERATTACK AND STATE RESPONSE 
Hostile cyber activities—including cyberattack for political gain, cyberwarfare 
and cyberespionage—are all threats that jeopardize a states’ ability to consolidate power 
within its own territory or project power beyond its borders. It is imperative that the 
international community recognize and deal with these threats. This realization stems 
primarily from the lessons learned in Estonia during the April-May 2007 cyberattack that 
became known as the first information war in Europe’s history.125  In fact, apart from the 
Titan Rain attacks against the U.S. defense industrial base and NASA in December of 
2005, it stands as the quintessential event in posing important political questions about 
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the larger definition of cyberwar, cyberattack and state-alliance responses to the same. As 
such, the Estonian cyberattack forces an examination of the current and future structure 
of the international cyberdomain.   
This chapter uses the Estonian case to deal with the fundamental questions that 
this event imposed; namely, the use of the cyberattack as a tool of political influence, the 
challenge with state attribution and the changes to state behavior that have occurred as a 
result. While previous chapters dealt principally with the cyberthreat emanating from 
major state actors like China, the Estonian case provides a different geographic area of 
study that yields similar results. The fundamental issues that affect the United States with 
regard to cyberespionage crosscut all geographic domains.  
C. ESTONIA CASE BACKGROUND 
In April 2007, the city government of Tallinn, Estonia, announced plans to 
remove a Soviet military statue from the city’s center to a military graveyard on its 
outskirts. The statue was initially erected to honor Soviet soldiers who died during World 
War II. As such, to the majority of Estonia’s population, the statute had become a symbol 
of Soviet annexation and occupation.126  Conversely, for Estonia’s one-quarter ethnic 
Russian population, its removal was an insult. In Russia, an outcry of nationalistic fever 
resulted in demonstrations and the targeting of the Estonian government. Russian 
language websites encouraged protesting and Internet activism. On April 25, the first of 
three waves of cyberattacks commenced in what some have called a “politically 
motivated cyber-riot.”127  These cyberattacks were primarily comprised of 
unsophisticated Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) tools employing botnets to flood 
and disrupt service to the cyber infrastructure of the Estonian government, media and 
banking sectors. This was the largest DDOS attack ever seen in Estonia and as one of the 
most wired nations in Europe, the rest of Europe took particular interest in the  
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vulnerability of the Estonian infrastructure to cyberattack.128  Thus, although the attack 
itself was labeled unsophisticated, its ability to disrupt civil society demonstrated to the 
international community the severity of the cyberthreat to the global order. 
D. DIFFICULTY OF STATE ATTRIBUTION 
In the wake of a hostile cyber activity, one goal for the forensic cyber investigator 
is to determine the organizations or individuals responsible. In order to conclusively 
determine these factors, investigators must first obtain evidence from within two subsets 
of attribution, technical and human attribution. Technical attribution consists of an 
analysis of a hostile action to classify the malicious cyber tools used and then locate the 
controlling or initiating cyber node.129  This includes tying the attack to an IP address or 
to a specific machine used in the attack. Human attribution builds upon the results of 
technical attribution to identify the person or organization responsible for the attack.130  
This could include determining the identity of the person who was logged into the 
machine during the attack period, or identifying the government organization where one 
or more simultaneous attacks originated. Positive attribution is therefore, the 
development of conclusive evidence from both technical and human attribution 
investigations. This is a level of attribution that is rarely achieved in the cyber 
environment due to the high levels of anonymity built into the structure of the cyber 
domain.   
Adding to the difficulty of attaining positive attribution are impediments with the 
conversion of technical analysis into identifiable human attribution. In other words, 
tracing an event back to a specific IP address or machine does not guarantee attribution to 
a singular human operator. Proving an individual responsible for a hostile cyber activity 
is complicated due to a variety of effective defense techniques that include evasion, 
deception and sheer denial.131  Savvy defense lawyers can easily construct these concepts 
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into reasonable doubt, which can lead a jury to believe that the individual identified 
through human attribution was not actually involved in the attack. This defense can be 
deconstructed in a U.S. court of law with proper evidence, but when attacks originate in a 
foreign country the issue of human attribution becomes complicated. 
In the United States, once a machine has been identified as having participated in 
an attack through technical attribution, authorities can typically gain access to it. Access 
then provides an opportunity to determine the presence of malicious code and allows 
further assessment of the cyber knowledge level of the machine’s key operator. These 
elements can establish human attribution where legal proceedings can hold responsible 
the perpetrators of cybercrime. However, in an international environment—where 
jurisdictional and political lines blur—gaining access to a machine for purposes of 
forensic deconstruction is nearly impossible.132  Proving state involvement in hostile 
cyber activities, therefore, becomes a significant hurdle to diplomatic means of curtailing 
such activity in cyberspace. 
The Estonian case provides a working context by which to analyze these 
difficulties of positive attribution. In the aftermath of the attack, the Estonian foreign 
minister claimed an investigation had determined a portion of the attack originated from 
official Russian government IP addresses; yet, their investigation lacked the sufficient 
human attribution quality needed for positive attribution.133  The Russian government 
denied direct involvement in the activity and demanded that such claims be supported 
with evidence. With only technical attribution, the Estonian claims were incomplete. 
Furthermore, technical analysis of the attack showed IP addresses emanating from 
178 countries and from more than one million computers.134  The cyberattacker in this 
case was able to hide within the large volume of cyber activity, gaining a cyber safety-net 
from positive attribution.   
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Circumstantial evidence can assist in determining human attribution, but it can 
also become mired in a swarm of contradicting variables. This occurred in the Estonian 
case through anonymous postings on Russian language websites that instructed 
participants how to run DDOS attacks or lease botnets for use against Estonia.135  These 
anonymous postings could not be attributed to either clandestine government units or 
cyber hacktivists alone. Inconsistent statements made from numerous individuals within 
Russian state bureaucracies and state-sponsored youth movements effectively 
manipulated speculation over the origin of the attack.136  As a result, attempts to prove 
attribution can became rather meaningless in the larger context, leading the policy maker 
to searching for additional options.   
E. LESSON’S LEARNED FROM THE ESTONIAN INCIDENT 
1. Forcing the International Community to Action 
The Estonian attack served as a wake-up call for the international community. 
Although speculation remained regarding attribution, the case proved that state power 
projection capabilities had changed and that cyberpower had arrived. This forced states to 
reevaluate the means of power projection to include such non-attributable cyber methods 
that destabilize society, cause economic turmoil and spread distrust of state 
institutions.137  In addition, the attack forced the international community to evaluate the 
definition of “cyberattack.”  Does such an attack amount to an act of aggression that 
affords the effected state the right to self-defense in accordance with Chapter VII, Article 
51, of the United Nations Charter,138 or is it something else?  
Recognition of this complication by the international community has placed a 
greater emphasis on the development of a stronger regulations process and the need to 
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reach international consensus on what constitutes a hostile cyberattack.139  The 
establishment of the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCE) in 
Tallinn, Estonia, is the manifestation of this realization by the European Union. Apart 
from the creation of a new European institution to deter and address cyber challenges, the 
incident was valuable in serving as a catalyst for dialogue regarding the institutional 
changes needed to classify, mitigate and politically address the future of cybersecurity. 
The Estonian cyberattack also forced the international community to evaluate the 
role of cyberpower for state and non-state actors, and it further clarified the centrality of 
the attribution problem as a fundamental catalyst for cyber conflict.140  This 
demonstrated the need for cooperative security reform as a means to limit cyberattack 
through greater attribution techniques. Positive attribution becomes a clear goal for any 
state or international security organization wishing to partake in the benefits of an 
interconnected world while reducing the risk of subversion. Only through positive 
attribution can cyber-attack become analogues to kinetic attack and subsequently be 
classified as an act of war. Developing this link should be the goal of cooperative security 
organizations. Creating this connection would remove the means by which cyberattack is 
conducted anonymously, thus improving state security in a globally connected world. 
While this becomes the goal, achieving this end raises questions about the international 
community’s capacity to achieve this level of attribution and even the degree to which 
such attribution would be desired if it could be attained.  
2. Does Attribution Even Matter? 
Within the realm of accusations, denials and claims of responsibility, the value of 
studying the details of the Estonian case lies in its ability to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the difficulty with attributing cyber activities to any one 
state or state institution. This lack of attribution places an imperative on the aspects of the 
Estonian attack that were definitive; namely, that the attack was organized, effective and 
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politically motivated.141  The ability to conduct cyber activities anonymously provides a 
distinct advantage to the cyberattacker over the cyberdefender. This advantage is 
magnified due to the low barriers to entry associated with Internet access and the 
widespread technical knowledge regarding the commission of such actions. The 
knowledge needed to produce malicious code or software for use in a cyberattack does 
not necessitate the intensive resources of a state, “brilliance in software development can 
be found anywhere, and the only physical resources required are a laptop and an Internet 
connection.”142  Thus, with careful planning almost any state or non-state actor can 
conduct a cyberattack with a high degree of plausible deniability.143  This creates a 
significant problem for the international community and for the national security agencies 
responsible for mitigating cyberthreats.   
Even in cases where both forms of attribution have been determined, taking the 
evidence to the international community through public disclosure has consequences that 
may override the decision to take such actions. The attacked state must be mindful that 
disclosing the methods and means that produced such attribution would consequently 
provide intelligence to the attacking state regarding how to modify its operations or make 
them more effective in the future.144  This would not only strengthen the future 
capabilities of an adversary to conduct cyberattack, but could also produce political 
blowback. This is especially true when other factors are present, such as extensive 
commercial or political ties between states as is the case between the United States and 
China. In this regard, the complex interdependence between these states does not negate 
the benefits of clandestine cyber behavior, but it may produce obstacles to attribution out 
of fear that such public disclosures may damage other critical aspects of the relationship. 
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3. Cyberattack as a Tool for Political Purpose 
One key piece of circumstantial evidence presented in the aftermath of the 
Estonian attack revealed Russian planning and strategy documents that approved 
cyberattack as an asymmetric implement for achieving the state’s political objectives.145  
Cyberattack as a mean to project power was therefore realized and planned for by the 
Russian government prior to the Estonian attack. In this context, the attack itself may 
have been the execution of a state policy that involved the use of cyberattack to exercise 
political influence upon another nation. However, absent an ability to prove Russian state 
involvement, the importance of this factor becomes the global recognition that 
cyberattack can be used as a means for the state to project its political will upon another 
in a non-attributable fashion. This changes the power paradigm through which states have 
traditionally exerted influence and it adds a new dimension to the study of international 
relations between states.   
Cyberpower is “the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence 
events in other operational environments and across the instruments of power.”146  
Joseph Nye Jr., addresses the growth of power in the cyberdomain as a new and 
revolutionizing force. Nye clarifies that state use of cyberpower can produce preferential 
outcomes both within and outside the cyberdomain.147  Cyberattack as a tool of political 
power is therefore two-sided. On one side, it can be used as a clandestine means of 
influence and intimidation, as seen in the Estonian example. On the other, as seen 
through the lens of China’s strategic military planners (covered in the previous chapter), 
it can be used to deter military intervention and even mitigate substantial technologically 
driven military advantages.  
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F. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS THAT REGULATE CYBERSPACE 
The current cyber environment has changed the dynamic by which the decision 
maker must address threats to national security. In the recent past, states could detect, 
deter and implement advanced early warning systems with technology, or rely on 
enforceable international agreements that limited state behavior.148  The contemporary 
properties of cyberspace—speed, lack of attribution, ease of knowledge and monetary 
efficiency—have all but erased the traditional political tools used to avert cyberattack. 
While cybercrime and cyberwarfare do not currently maintain the same destructive 
properties of past weapons of mass destruction, cyberattack is used with prevailing 
frequency. The need to counter state-to-state cyberattack therefore appears to necessitate 
an international solution built upon normative patterns of behavior and international 
agreements that constrain the state use of cyberweapons for military purposes, while 
building strong international cooperative mechanisms to effectively investigate and 
prosecute transnational cybercrime.   
While this approach is currently being explored as a means to limit cyberattack, 
cyberwarfare and cybercrime, it generally omits cyberespionage. It is important to clarify 
that cyberespionage juxtaposed to these others threats is not considered equivalent and its 
omission is largely intentional.149  All states employ intelligence services, and nearly all 
states use those services to commit espionage on behalf of their own national interest. 
Cyberespionage is therefore seen as a tacit quid-pro-quo in that it serves the interests of 
individual states while at the same time it jeopardizes the national security of others. As 
such, states are reluctant to include cyberespionage language in any international 
mechanism that seeks to limit hostile cyber activity.150  The United States is principally 
guilty of this, but it suffers from a duality not shared by most states. While the United 
States has significant signals intelligence capacity, it also remains the main target for 
cyberespionage. Other states have an equal amount to gain from cyberespionage, but their 
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vulnerability to such action is much less. Thus, the lack of cyberespionage language from 
current international proposals to limit hostile cyber activity leaves the national security 
policy maker with little confidence that the cyberespionage threat posed to the United 
States can be curtailed through such liberal or constructivist attempts alone.  
G. ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS ON 
CYBERSPACE 
The current trend toward development of international treaties, agreements and 
norms of behavior to restrict nation-state use of cyberspace as a tool of political or 
military power lacks impact. In 1998, the Russian Federation introduced to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations a resolution calling for greater international restrictions 
on cyberspace activities. Resolution 53/70 titled Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security attempted 
to broaden the context of security and disarmament to the cyberdomain. The United 
States and several European states generally opposed this resolution due to concern that 
“such a treaty could be used to limit the freedom of information under the guise of 
increasing information and telecommunications security.”151  The United States finally 
signed onto a modified form of the resolution in 2009 after the Russian government 
strengthened the resolution to address these U.S. concerns.152  Consequently, the 
resolution has become a non-binding agreement between signatory states who only agree 
that further discussion is warranted in an attempt to reach mutual understanding regarding 
cybersecurity. In this form, the UN resolution is merely a tool to spur further dialogue 
and the UN itself simply a forum for future cooperative exploration. 
On September 14, 2011, an international cyber code of conduct governing 
information security was developed within the United Nations General Assembly and 
sent to the general secretary for dissemination. The drafters of this code of conduct, 
Russia, China, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, appear to recognize the need for greater 
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international engagement on the principles that govern state conduct within cyberspace, 
but their intentions for leading the effort on a code of conduct to govern behavior in this 
realm appear questionable. Russia and China both have negative records when it comes 
to the use of cyberspace to project state power. Russia is generally regarded as the only 
state to use cyberweapons in a non-war context, as evidenced in the Estonian case. For its 
part, China has sought to control the distribution of information its citizens receive 
through cyberspace with the implementation of The Great Firewall. This action limits 
Internet freedom and allows for the monitoring of dissident activity, both as a means for 
the state to maintain authoritarian control.153 
The United States is generally against any such international mechanisms unless 
they contain within their provisions a section that addresses the need to preserve Internet 
freedoms.154  As such, a multilateral code of conduct that addresses the preservation of 
Internet freedom would appear to garner larger international support and may be the best 
way to limit the frequency and breadth of cyberattack while establishing international 
norms that could lead to more binding agreements in the future. 
The need for an international regime with strong enforcement protocols has also 
spurred debate over the creation of a cyberweapons regulatory regime similar to those of 
the nuclear, chemical and biologic arms control regimes. Applied to cyberwarfare, the 
purpose of such a regime would be to delegitimize the use of the cyberweapon as an 
effective tool for achieving military objectives. The United States would appear to be a 
significant benefactor from the establishment of such a mechanism, due to the increased 
dependence of American society and the military upon its cyber infrastructure.155  Yet, 
even if the United States were willing to lead a regulatory ban on such weapons, it would 
be nearly impossible to include any verification protocol into its charter.156  The lack of a 
verification protocol all but renders a cyber arms control regime ineffective, and in fact 
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could end up harming the national security of litigious societies when compared with 
states that have higher tolerance for corruption, like China and Russia.157 
While the arms control regimes that restrict the use of weapons of mass 
destruction are generally regarded as successful; these control regimes are based on an 
accepted set of universally accepted taboos in that their use is morally reprehensible to a 
preponderance of the global human population. Joseph Nye Jr. points out that these 
taboos were developed independent of state-state negotiation and were rather the product 
of independent learning over time.158  His claim presents both a positive and negative 
dynamic when analyzing the effectiveness of a cyberweapons control regime.   
From a positive standpoint, it suggests that independent learning in the 
cyberdomain may pave the way for active cyber cooperation at a later date. This is 
especially true for states like China and Russia, who are realizing an increased difficultly 
in controlling their own cyber-hacktivists and may therefore, have an expanded need for 
regulation in the future.159  However, from a negative perspective, this principle fails to 
recognize that a large impetus for a state’s willingness to join the chemical and biological 
weapons conventions relied on an accepted understanding that these weapons lack 
military utility on the battlefield.160  This lack of utility does not appear to affect 
cyberweapons, which have been proven effective and efficient tools to support military 
objectives. Nor does the argument appear to recognize that in some respects, the 
employment of a cyberweapon to prosecute a military target is in many ways morally 
superior than destroying the same target with a kinetic weapon. So, while Nye is correct 
to assert that independent learning may pave the way for future cooperation, the utility of 
these weapons for military purposes will prevent nations from banning their use through 
official mechanisms. This analysis determines that limiting the state use of cyberweapons 
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through the development and enforcement of control mechanisms fails to create an 
incentive for states to ratify any such mechanisms in the near future. 
H. CYBERCRIME CONVENTION 
The Council of Europe Cyber Convention serves as the only binding cyber-crime 
regulatory mechanism within the international community.161  As of June 7, 2012 the 
convention had 47 state signatories, 34 of whom had ratified the convention through their 
own governments.162  The convention carries an accountability provision that includes an 
obligation to assist other member states in the investigation and mitigation of cybercrime 
emanating from within one’s own territory. The convention also carries a promise by 
signatories to adopt legislation and foster international cooperation within their borders in 
an effort to develop a common criminal code to address transnational cybercrime.163  
Lastly, the convention has been successful in developing both extradition policies and 
mutual law enforcement practices among member states.164  These developments have 
given a boost to the international community’s capacity to regulate cybercrime. 
Yet, for all the above mentioned benefits, the convention remains relatively weak. 
It allows for a member state to decline assistance in the fulfillment of its obligation on 
fairly broad grounds. Overall, it lacks an enforcement mechanism to ensure member 
compliance and it does not address a realistic timeline by which members need respond 
to demands for assistance.165  As such, the only binding attribute of the convention is in 
effect the willingness of member states to comply with its provisions. Therefore, the 
convention’s largest contribution to the international community becomes its norm-
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generating potential as participating states develop common approaches toward curtailing 
the severity of cybercrime through cooperative learning.  
I. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AS AN EFFECTIVE METHOD OF 
CURTAILING CYBERTHREATS 
There are other proposals that seek to limit cybercrime and state sponsored 
cyberattack through an evolution of currently accepted international laws to better reflect 
cybersecurity issues. This includes a proposal that calls for an extension of the Law of 
Armed Conflict (LOAC) to account for the use of information systems.166  This proposal 
would render any attack that violates the LOAC by conventional means as a violation of 
the LOAC if carried out by cyber means.167  Assimilating the LOAC to cover cyberattack 
therefore carries a strong enforcement mechanism through the international criminal 
court system; however, the issue of positive attribution remains.   
In this instance, the best scenario to attain a positive development for reducing the 
risk of hostile cyber activity may be in the state level implementation of a no first use 
policy. Such a policy adheres to the principle that a cyber arms control mechanism should 
not eliminate state capability—as the other forms of arms control regimes do—and rather 
that policies should only be implemented that prohibit acts.168  To make this easier for 
states to immediately implement, a no first use policy does not have to be a multi-lateral 
agreement. States could choose to follow the path instituted by President Nixon in 1969 
when he issued a unilateral policy that the United States would dismantle its bioweapons 
stockpile and would refrain from their use in warfare.169  This unilateral declaration later 
garnered a similar response from the Soviet Union. The later convergence of these 
unilateral decisions catalyzed the success of the Biological Weapons Convention with 
support from the international community. This example shows that limiting the damage 
done from cyberattack is only one component of a successful international treaty 
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governing cyberspace, establishing norms that reduce the likelihood of attacks are equally 
important. The path to norm development can start with individual states, yet any of these 
approaches are absent in the current international security environment.   
J. CONCLUSION  
As referenced throughout this chapter, the cyberattack on Estonia serves as a 
fundamental case study for assessing the issues surrounding the state sponsored use of the 
cyber domain to project power. As such, the Estonian example has derivative lessons that 
can be applied to any contemporary debate on cybersecurity because it serves as the 
initial case that extrapolates the issues of cyberpower, attribution and the complexities 
surrounding the formation of institutions. Principally, the case shows the difficulty with 
attribution and how an overall lack of accountability has become the main enabler of 
cyberattack. Efforts to produce an international cyberdomain that includes attribution 
have become mired in technical challenges, and even if such hurdles were overcome 
there is speculation regarding the political utility of attribution in state-to-state relations. 
The Estonian case has also provided a context to assess the various proposed and 
in place methods for mitigating hostile cyber activities covered in this chapter; namely, 
the establishment of cyber norms, international agreements, codes of conduct, ratification 
or assimilation of laws and attempts to solve the attribution problem. All of these 
solutions require a significant investment in time and resources before they can become 
effective. Faced with an existential threat to American national security, national leaders 
do not have the luxury of adopting solutions that require such investments of time. The 
national security decision maker thus faces a quandary in responding to hostile threats in 
cyberspace. Recognizing that the international cyberattacker has an advantage over the 
state’s cyber defenders, the question becomes one of offense or defense and the political 
risks versus rewards of attribution.   
Playing defense alone does not provide a capacity to mitigate threats before they 
become attacks, and the complexity of human attribution makes political accusations 
nearly irrelevant. Therefore, increasing the offensive components of the national security 
establishment to effectively search out, classify, identify and work with international 
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partners to mitigate both state and non-state threats is an exercise in increasing cyber and 
state security. The current liberal and constructivist proposals for limiting hostile cyber 
activity in the international cyberdomain do not afford the U.S. national security decision 
maker an avenue for addressing the cyberespionage threat in a timely manner. Instituting 
a proficient defensive and offensive capability within the U.S. counterintelligence 
community is therefore a means of effectively addressing cyberespionage within the 
present time limitations. A detailed analysis of what is required to create this capacity is 
covered in the next chapter. 
In 2012, upon giving his recommendations on improving cybersecurity, Dr. Larry 
Wortzel stated before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, that “Congress should 
ensure that the appropriate federal agencies are working with their counterparts in allied 
and friendly countries to detect and combat malicious cyber activity.”170  This statement 
recognizes the need to increase cybersecurity effectiveness through the development of 
international partnerships. However, while there is little ambiguity in his 
recommendation to “detect” malicious activity, there is great room for interpretation 
regarding how to effectively “combat” malicious activity, especially as one engages with 
international partners. Not all international partnerships can be created equal as 
demonstrated in the vast amounts of security intelligence shared in the intelligence 
partnership between the allied nations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States (AUSCANNZUKUS, or the Five Eyes). Yet, a focus 
strictly on improving the cooperative liaison between these countries omits the perceived 
gains from enhancing cooperation with other friendly nations, such as Taiwan.   
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IV. DEVELOPING INCREASED CAPACITY TO COUNTER 
CYBERESPIONAGE: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MICRO-
RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
DoD will continue to work with domestic and international allies and 
partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, 
operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace.171 
This chapter explores domestic and international micro-restructuring initiatives 
that increase capacity to mitigate cyberespionage. From the domestic perspective the 
chapter will seek to address changes in the structure of DoD Counterintelligence as a 
means to eliminate stove-pipes, address efficiency and bring DoD CI in line with the 
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This strategy places an 
emphasis on developing joint operational counterintelligence support at the COCOM 
level, principally within each of the CYBERCOM sponsored Joint Cyber Centers (JCC). 
This approach builds on the success of the joint Strategic Counterintelligence 
Directorates (SCID)—used effectively to address counterintelligence issues in the 
contingency environments of Iraq and Afghanistan—to apply the SCID model toward 
effective mitigation of cyberespionage within the COCOM.  
International restructuring addresses a host of U.S. policy documents that 
emphasize expanding international cyber cooperation to friendly nations and the degree 
to which such cooperation could include Taiwan. Research conducted in fulfillment of 
the latter included consultations with Taiwanese national security, DoD Policy and law 
enforcement professionals to obtain direction for further research. This included on-the-
ground research in Taiwan as a means to gain a broad understanding of both the 
Taiwanese and American perspective for increased cyber cooperation.  
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B. DOMESTIC MICRO-RESTRUCTURING: INCREASING CAPACITY 
1. DoD Strategic Initiatives for Developing Domestic Capacity in 
Cyberspace 
In July 2011, DoD released its first strategic policy document regarding defense 
of its cyber domain. The document listed five strategic initiatives for operating in 
cyberspace. Two of these initiatives pertain directly to information contained within this 
thesis. They are listed as: 
 Strategic Initiative 2 (SI2): Employ new defense operating concepts to protect 
DoD networks and systems172 
 Strategic Initiative 3 (SI3): Partner with other U.S. government departments and 
agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity 
strategy.173 
SI2 deals principally with increases to defensive operations that seek to “form an 
adaptive and dynamic defense of DoD networks and systems.”174  The document further 
defined that SI2 will strengthen DoD critical infrastructure by going beyond the current 
focus on information assurance to include an exploration of “new operating concepts” 
that have the potential to reduce vulnerabilities.175  SI2 primarily advocates attaining 
these objectives through increased integration of cyber technology to harden the target 
and reduce the risk of insider threats. Additionally, it proposes a shift to “active cyber 
defense,” which seeks to monitor DoD cyber infrastructure in real time to discover, 
detect, discover, analyze and mitigate threats.176  From a defensive perspective, these 
changes are warranted and astute, but the language contained within the report also 
provides an allowance for the development of increased offensive counterintelligence 
capabilities as a means to further defend DoD networks. The rest of this chapter will 
address SI2 in this regard, as it fulfills the development of capacities that seek to form an 
adaptive and dynamic defense through the development of new operating concepts. 
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SI3 addresses the need for DoD to continue working closely with interagency 
partners on new and innovative ways to increase national cybersecurity.177  This initiative 
deals primarily with expanded cooperation between DoD and DHS, and the development 
of programs that protect sensitive information within the Defense Industrial Base. 
However, similar to SI2, the language included in SI3 provides for further development 
of cooperation between DoD entities, like DoD CI and external partners that are yet to be 
developed. This stance on cybersecurity is encouraging as it shows a recognition and 
desire to develop capacity through non-traditional approaches to partnership 
development. This concept will likewise be explored throughout the chapter as it pertains 
to cyberespionage.  
2. Addressing Domestic Micro-restructuring 
“Creating organizational arrangements in which the analysts and collectors 
systematically collaborate would improve each of them.”   
–Joel Brenner, former NCIX 
Developing organization arrangements that improve effectiveness is the ultimate 
means for the elimination of stove-pipes and creating unity of effort across the USCI 
enterprise. While this concept is addressed in numerous CI policy documents, little has 
been done to change the structure of USCI to achieve these goals. The 2010 
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative references the need for a government-
wide cyber counterintelligence plan “to coordinate activities across all Federal Agencies 
to detect, deter, and mitigate the foreign-sponsored cyberintelligence threat to U.S. and 
private sector information systems.”178  This language is clear recognition that the USCI 
enterprise must strive to eliminate stove-pipes and increase effectiveness toward 
mitigating the cyberespionage threat. While the report recognizes this need, it provides 
scant direction to the counterintelligence community regarding how to develop such 
capacity increases. Highlighting this point, the report states: 
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To accomplish these goals, the plan establishes and expands cyber CI 
education and awareness programs and workforce development to 
integrate CI into all cyber operations and analysis, increase employee 
awareness of the cyber CI threat, and increase counterintelligence 
collaboration across the government.179 
Educating and increasing employee awareness are the only definitive suggestions 
contained within this report for establishing a more effective cybercounterintelligence 
capacity. These solutions are irrelevant to a cross-section of the civil service workforce 
that is already highly educated toward their professional duties and whose awareness 
level need only expand to encompass cyberespionage as a prolific threat to national 
security. The other features contained within the proposal, integrating CI into all aspects 
of cyber operations and increasing collaboration across the government, is astute; 
however, accomplishing these tasks without first creating appropriate structure is nearly 
impossible.  
Government bureaucracies have an acute resistance to change and are 
increasingly more risk averse. This concept has a strong impact on the degree to which 
cross-cutting collaboration amongst the counterintelligence community can be attained. 
The New Institutionalist model would suggest the reason for such aversion is that 
bureaucratic functionaries are seldom motivated to change the structure of organizations 
in which they personally benefit. After all, the bureaucrat responsible for making the 
decision to take risk or accept structural change has risen within the very system that 
needs restructuring. In fact, they are vested in their current structure. This creates a lack 
of incentive for addressing effectiveness, especially when such increases require macro-
level changes. This analysis does not connote a derogatory labeling of the decision 
maker, rather it is meant to state that bureaucratic parochialism—and the culture of the 
institution itself—plays a strong role in the decision making process. This has principally 
been the problem with efforts to create a consolidated Defense Bureau of Investigation, 
or even the more tangible example of the DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) 
from 2002–2008. These large restructuring initiatives generally fail due to the New 
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Institutionalist bureaucratic model referenced. With this concept in mind, the next section 
explores small changes that do not impact upon such decision making factors, and as 
such could lead to increased counterintelligence effectiveness within the DoD as it 
pertains to cyberespionage.  
a. A Need to Narrow the Focus 
The October 2011 NCIX report on cyberespionage lists “improved 
collaboration” as one method through which the Intelligence Community can respond to 
the increased cyberespionage threat. Improved collaboration in this regard highlighted the 
need for a coordinated response at the national level, the result of which was the 
establishment of the National Cyber Counterintelligence Working Group (NCIWG). This 
working group, comprised of the sixteen members of the IC and several other federal 
agencies, meets to build improved collaboration across the enterprise.180  It is doubtful 
that top-level government working groups are the answer to eliminating stove-pipes and 
improving effectiveness within the counterintelligence community. Historic precedent 
indicates that without an ability to demand compliance or the power to control budgets, 
such working groups are reduced to venues for individual agencies to consolidate stove-
pipes rather than remove barriers.181 
The NCIX report also calls for improved analysis, collection, offensive 
operations, training and awareness as ways for the USCI to more adequately address the 
cyberespionage threat in the United States.182  In other words, apart from aligning some 
counterintelligence functions toward combating cyberthreats, the counterintelligence 
community at large will continue business as usual. This statement may appear  
anecdotal, but when analyzed without prejudice it begs the question: what has the 
counterintelligence community been doing if it has not always focused on improving 
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analysis, collection, offensive operations, training and awareness? The lack of relevant 
guidance contained within this report is rather absurd and most likely offensive to a 
counterintelligence community that would like to hear meaningful suggestions for 
building stronger capacity toward threat mitigation. 
How is it that direction from the nation’s top counterintelligence office is 
so watered down? A former director from the same organization, Joel Brenner 2006–
2009, had a comment that elucidates this point, “[t]he higher cybersecurity 
recommendations rise in the bureaucracy, the greater the chance they’ll be watered down 
to achieve consensus, or sidelined. This is why we get continual declarations of urgency 
but little real progress.”183  Brenner’s comment underscores the need to make inter-
departmental vice community wide reform decisions, i.e., those that only require a 
mandate from a single secretary rather than attempts to gain acceptance across 
departments. The Secretary of Defense Department is uniquely positioned to issue 
restructuring orders to the counterintelligence units within DoD that comprise the bulk of 
the government’s offensive counterintelligence capacity. Without such direction, 
individual counterintelligence agencies will continue to plot their own course and 
subsequently languish from a lack of effective leadership at the national level.   
Narrowing the focus of reform to only the DoD OFCO counterintelligence 
units is therefore an effective means of building a stronger capacity to mitigate 
cyberespionage. As the DoD is perhaps the most negatively impacted department from all 
forms of hostile cyber activity, leadership within the department has the most incentive to 
generate small scale reforms that will truly create unity of effort, improve collaboration 
and increase effectiveness. Without such direction, DoD counterintelligence units will 
continue to receive a smattering of useless direction that instructs them to improve areas 
they already focus on, or instructions from a national working group whose directives 
becomes too watered down to prove effective.   
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b. In Violation of Goldwater-Nichols? 
“To the extent that DoD counterintelligence is viewed as a unitary set of 
missions, functions, and resources, it is a relic of the pre-1986 U.S. 
military establishment.”184 
If the incentives presented in the previous section do not prove strong 
enough to induce the DoD decision maker to institute micro-reforms across the DoD 
counterintelligence enterprise, then perhaps the failure to comply with the Goldwater-
Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GWN) produces additional incentive. The 
Goldwater-Nichols Act reformed the military force structure to place operational control 
within joint Combatant Commands (COCOMs), addressing a previously demonstrated 
inability of the military services to effectively conduct joint operations.185  The statutory 
changes to Title 10 of the U.S. Code established that operational matters would become 
the providence of the COCOMs while administrative matters would remain the 
responsibility of the individual service Secretaries. With only few exceptions “the 
Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to 
unified and specified combatant commands…to perform missions assigned to those 
commands.”186  For this reason, operational control of the U.S. Armed Forces now 
resides within the COCOMs; yet, the DoD CI community completely avoided the main 
thrust of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.  
This avoidance has resulted in a DoD CI community that remains 
operationally controlled by the separate military departments, not the Combatant 
Commanders (CCDR). This has left DoD CI in the hands of organizers and trainers and 
not the planners and operators who are closest to the foreign intelligence challenges 
facing the DoD.187  This legacy structure impairs effectiveness as it fails to enact a 
forcing mechanism or incentive structure for joint operations that support COCOM 
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requirements.188  This analysis, used to evaluate DoD CI effectiveness at mitigating 
cyberespionage, indicates that the CCDR has a limited ability to assign joint DoD OFCO 
resources to mitigate a perceived FIS threat to their cyber infrastructure. This creates a 
problem for counterintelligence effectiveness as a whole, which translates to an increased 
vulnerability for the CCDR whose assets are in jeopardy. Thus, rather than tasking CI 
assets directly, the CCDR must rely on a complex process of DoD CI liaison support to 
coordinate with the respective CI services. This structure typically includes the 
assignment of a senior counterintelligence advisor to the CCDR staff, known as a 
Command Counterintelligence Coordination Authority (CCICA), whose responsibility is 
to deconflict counterintelligence issues and provide CI expertise to the COCOM.189  
Additionally, the CICCA typically has a staff comprised of analysts and special agents 
from the various DoD CI services. This structure provides the COCOM without an innate 
operational capacity as the activities of DoD CI remain under the control of the individual 
military departments. 
(1) Continued Neglect of Goldwater-Nichols. Continued lack of 
accountability for DoD Counterintelligence to adhere to the joint operational principles 
mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act principally deals with the New Institutionalist 
concept of culture. As mentioned previously, counterintelligence operates within a 
vacuum of secrecy. This secrecy has produced very little information for the national 
security decision maker to gain insight into the structure and function of 
counterintelligence. Aiding to this dilemma is that intelligence oversight in the United 
States is a process that focuses primarily on ensuring legality and not effectiveness. Such 
a focus on propriety seeks to determine that actions are conducted in accordance with 
U.S. law and that civil liberties and financial resources are not abused.190  
Counterintelligence oversight is expanded slightly, but only as a means to explore 
“lapses,” or the investigation of counterespionage failures that produced the likes of 
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Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen.191  Evaluating effectiveness is not a significant 
component of oversight in the United States, primarily because the congressional and 
executive organs responsible for oversight do not have an optic by which to evaluate 
counterintelligence effectiveness. The USCI community has therefore sought refuge 
within its culture of secrecy to avoid scrutiny over effectiveness in the fulfillment of its 
mission objectives. For DoD CI elements, this has included an ability to continually 
neglect the joint mandates of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.    
While this initial analysis appears to suggest that USCI is complicit 
in disregarding the mandates of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, further examination indicates 
that the lack of CI compliance does not reside within its culture of secrecy alone. As 
mentioned previously, Title 10 of the U.S. Code states that “all forces” shall be assigned 
to the COCOMs.192  However, there are also clearly stated statutory exceptions to the 
general principle of “all forces” to include forces assigned to carry out the functions of 
the Secretary of a military department.193  Such functions are generally summarized as 
those that are associated with the need to organize, train and equip each military 
service.194  Yet, another exception maintains that each service Secretary will remain 
responsible for “the effective supervision and control of the intelligence activities” within 
their department.195  Herein lies the ambiguity, Title 10 does not specifically categorize 
counterintelligence personnel. If counterintelligence personnel are to be categorized as 
“all forces” then their operational control should lie with the COCOMs; yet, if they are 
considered a subset of “intelligence activities,” then the latter would exempt them from 
being assigned to Combatant Commands.196  This second exception is primarily why 
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operational control of above-service intelligence agencies like DIA, NSA and the 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) remain subordinate to the Secretary of Defense 
vice attached to a specific COCOM.   
In all of the these referenced cases the agencies themselves operate 
under Title 50 intelligence authorities, and their exclusion from an “all forces” status is 
rarely in contention. However, counterintelligence—as an inherently law enforcement 
function in the United States—operates under Title 18 authorities and DoD CI elements 
operate in an awkward hybrid of Title 10 (Military), 18 (Criminal) and 50 (Intelligence) 
authorities. Subsequently, the statutes themselves provide no clear guidance to DoD CI 
regarding its alignment with Goldwater-Nichols. This ambiguity is most likely the reason 
why DoD CI has never been held accountable for not conforming to GWN. Disentangling 
the legal authorities for DoD CI in this regard may create more questions than answers. 
As such, in order to better understand where DoD CI truly falls within the joint 
operational environment, one must analysis the intent of the law rather than its opaque 
design. 
(2) Conforming to Intent. The intent behind the Goldwater-Nichols 
Defense Reorganization Act was to improve military effectiveness in the wake of 
perceived national security failures. It is doubtful that the designers intended to create 
additional bureaucratic obstacles or complex laws for the national security establishment 
to interpret. Thus, evaluating the degree to which DoD CI is in violation of—or in 
keeping with—the Defense Reorganization Act places an unnecessary emphasis on an 
ambiguous legal issue rather than on developing adequate structures that improve 
effectiveness. In keeping with the spirit of the reorganization effort, an impetus should be 
placed on the intent behind GWN; thus, changing the debate to focus on effective 
restructuring. By adhering to intent, the DoD decision maker is left seeking solutions that 
could increase effectiveness of DoD Counterintelligence. One possible solution would be 
to place certain offensive elements under the direction of the COCOMs, whether 




on the degree to which such restructuring would increase jointness across the DoD CI 
enterprise while subsequently providing alignment of perceived COCOM threats with 
capabilities.   
c. Building Capacity in Relation to Cyberespionage 
The current DoD counterintelligence structure places the Combatant 
Commander at a distinct disadvantage. The CCDR who determines cyberespionage has 
adversely affected theater security, combat effectiveness or intelligence systems under 
their control must engage in a lengthy coordination process to attain operational support 
from the DoD CI services. As such, the CCDR cannot currently call upon elements 
within their command to mitigate these threats. This system is not satisfactory, and the 
CCDR seeks new options to develop a mitigation capacity that can more effectively 
address such threats.197 The DoD cyber community has recognized the need to provide 
the CCDR with timely and accurate support in fulfillment of CND capabilities with the 
development of a Joint Cyber Center (JCC) within each COCOM. JCCs are operationally 
controlled by the COCOM but staffed with CYBERCOM personnel. They are 
responsible for providing direct cyber support to the COCOM, while coordinating their 
activities with their parent organization. This model places a stronger capacity for CND 
within the COCOM and develops a strong coordination mechanism for CNA and CNE 
support through CYBERCOM.198  However, while the establishment of the JCC 
improves COCOM capabilities in regard to ensuring network integrity, it currently has no 
bearing on counterintelligence support. CCDRs require an innate level of 
counterintelligence support to illuminate operational advantages and to sustain integrity 
of plans and operations; however, the current structure does not provide this level of 
support. 
The CCDR obtains counterintelligence support—of the defensive or 
offensive variety—through the J2X and the CCICA. The CCICA, as the senior CI advisor 
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and subject matter expert, relays requests for assistance through their staff to the respective 
DoD CI services. Operational plans are then independently developed within each DoD 
CI service, tasked to a CI unit for action and then sent back to the CCICA through staff 
channels for coordination with the COCOM. If the proposed counterintelligence action 
lies within the continental United States, then the DoD CI service must also coordinate 
any action with the FBI. This process is complex and does not always adhere to the time 
demands of the COCOM.199  Additionally, this process leaves the COCOM without 
innate counterintelligence support and reliant on the services to fulfill their threat needs. 
Unfortunately, the services are also being requested to provide support from other 
COCOMS, or other domestic law enforcement entities, and thus have to weigh their 
response against their own limited resources.   
Changing the structure of this process to adhere with a GWN framework 
would provide the CCDR with a much needed innate operational counterintelligence 
function. This would subsequently reduce the redundancy among the services and 
provide increased efficiency for the use of scarce resources. Attaching a joint cyber-
OFCO element to the Joint Cyber Center could provide the increased level of 
effectiveness required across the enterprise. Similar to the JCC model, the cyber-OFCO 
unit would be focused on cyberespionage issues that directly affect the COCOM. Their 
staffing structure would likewise be similar, where operational control resides at the 
COCOM with administrative control provided by CYBERCOM, in that operational 
control would reside at the COCOM while staffed independently from NCIS, AFOSI, 
Army CI and DCHC. The COCOM JCC would therefore have a resident cyber-OFCO 
joint counterintelligence unit that could respond quickly and effectively to the joint 
command’s perceived cyberespionage threats.   
Adding to the feasibility of this approach is a tested and proven model of 
joint counterintelligence collaboration within the contingency environments of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. DoD CI elements worked effectively in joint Strategic Counterintelligence 
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Directorates (SCID) throughout the contingency period. Each SCID maintained an 
executive agency on a rotational basis, and was traditionally staffed with personnel from 
the DoD CI elements of NCIS, AFOSI and Army CI.200  DoD Directive 5240.9 has since 
replaced the SCID with the Joint Counterintelligence Unit (JCIU), although it functions 
in similar capacity.201  JCIUs report to the Theater Commander for operational direction 
and function autonomously to provide counterintelligence support.  
It is important to note that SCIDs were not developed and implemented as 
the result of a legal interpretation of the Defense Reorganization Act. Rather, the 
SCID/JCIU concept was established through the recognition of a capability gap coupled 
with an exigent need to develop a capacity to support the Contingency Commander. This 
brought out the best in DoD CI as each service put aside bureaucratic parochialism in an 
effort to develop increased effectiveness. This same capability gap and exigent need are 
now prevalent in addressing the cyberespionage threat. Replicating the JCIU model 
within select COCOM JCCs would be a tangible means of prosecuting offensive 
counterintelligence operations that mitigate cyberespionage.   
d. Developing the JCIU Model toward Mitigating Cyberespionage 
Opponents to this micro-restructuring model would be correct to point out 
that current DoD Directive only allows for the formation of JCIUs within environments 
designated as a Joint Operations Area (JOA).202  This appears to be a legal obstacle for 
implementing JCIUs within the COCOM JCCs; however, this does not limit the options 
available to the DoD decision maker regarding the establishment of an operational CI 
unit within the JCCs under some other name. In this regard, the JCIU would be seen as a 
proven model and forcing mechanism that compels the DoD CI services to staff and 
operate out of joint units. Additionally, speculation would point to an apparent manpower 
requirement that the services currently cannot afford. Unfortunately, this would most 
                                                 
200 Louis Beyer, “Defense Investigators and the War on Terrorism,” The Journal of Public Inquiry 
(spring/summer 2006), 6. 
201 United States Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 1–02: Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms,” 172. 
202 Consultation with U.S. law enforcement official (6 June 2012), while discussing the structure of 
the COCOM J2X and CI effectiveness issues. 
 68
likely be used as an excuse by the CI services rather than an actual limitation. 
Historically, the DoD CI services staffed a multitude of SCIDs within Iraq and 
Afghanistan. As the United States continues to reduce its presence in these locations, the 
available CI manpower could be reallocated toward JCIU-like units within the JCCs.  
Creating an innate Cyber-OFCO capacity within the COCOM JCCs, 
directly modeled after the proven SCID/JCIU model, eliminates a great deal of the 
redundancies and answers concerns over fiscal responsibility. Additionally, creating such 
a capacity within the COCOMs eliminates the need for some of the CI coordination 
function with each COCOM. These coordination billets could be reabsorbed by the 
services or restructured into multiple operational billets within the JCC. The executive 
agency for each Cyber-OFCO unit would be responsible for conducting coordination 
directly with the COCOM via the CCICA, while taking the operational imperatives of the 
CCDR directly back to the Cyber-OFCO unit for execution. Lastly, the DoD CI services 
would benefit from joint capacity increases in which they no longer develop operations 
independent of one another, but rather—through joint activities—develop and execute 
consolidated operations built on each services’ own inherent strengths. 
3. Domestic Level Restructuring, Conclusion 
The current DoD CI structure utilizes an archaic organizational form that creates 
ineffective and wasteful results. As demonstrated through this analysis, the degree to 
which the DoD CI services are legally forced to conduct joint operations is immaterial. 
Rather, what GWN illuminates is that the intent for increased effectiveness is an 
imperative. Over the past 25 years the reorganization benefits provided by GWN has 
clearly demonstrated that joint capacity development does result in increased 
effectiveness. The protection of parochial self-interest was just as unacceptable 25 years 
ago as it is for counterintelligence in the contemporary environment. Combining 
cyberespionage in a joint Cyber-OFCO unit, similar in structure to the JCIU model but 
within the JCC of each COCOM, is therefore, a practice in increased effectiveness across 
the DoD CI enterprise. Implementing this approach adheres to the current impetus for 
pragmatic and efficient solutions to combat cyberespionage and further fulfills DoD 
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policy directives that call for greater collaboration. Instituting such a process would 
provide the CCDR with an increased capability to address cyberthreats to his or her 
COCOM while ensuring the integrity of the DoD Global Information Grid. 
C. INTERNATIONAL MICRO-RESTRUCTURING: INCREASED 
COOPERATION WITH TAIWAN 
The interdependence of the U.S. Counterintelligence community is also 
manifest in our relationships with liaison services. We cannot cut off these 
relationships because of concern about security, but experience has 
certainly shown that we must calculate the risks involved as realistically as 
possible. –Austin Matschulat, 1963 
While Matschulat’s words were meant to describe the importance of DoD CI 
cooperation with South Vietnam, as a means to develop an increased capacity to mitigate 
the Soviet intelligence threat, these words are just as relevant today regarding current 
threats as they were when he wrote them. Expanding this understanding to include 
cybersecurity capacity development with Taiwan adheres to the principle that liaison 
relationships can be established for the benefit of CI effectiveness if the risks are 
calculated in a rational manner. Choosing not to expand these relationships due security 
concerns alone limits growth and displays a lack of faith in the professional abilities of 
our USCI professionals to adequate navigate these hurdles. 
1. DoD Strategic Initiative for Developing International Capacity in 
Cyberspace 
Leveraging international partners as a means to increase capacity in Cyberspace is 
echoed by current DoD policy. Strategic Initiative number four of the DoD Operating in 
Cyberspace report specifically provides that the Department of Defense should, “[b]uild 
robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective 
cybersecurity.”203  The report goes on to suggest a number of tangible benefits to such 
cooperation: 
The development of international shared situational awareness and 
warning capabilities will enable collective self-defense and collective 
                                                 
203 United States Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in 
Cyberspace” (July 2011), 9. 
 70
deterrence. By sharing timely indicators about cyber events, threat 
signatures of malicious code, and information about emerging actors and 
threats, allies and international partners can increase collective cyber 
defense.204 
Increasing collective cyber defense provides both direct and indirect benefit to the United 
States. From a CI perspective, the direct benefits are those highlighted in the passage 
above; namely, the sharing of malicious code and information about emerging actors. 
Indirectly, developing capacity in this regard produces trust and strengthens state-state 
relations. The resulting interdependence provides states with an increased deterrent 
capacity and ability to respond to threats with increased effectiveness. Creating this 
capacity with Taiwan provides the United States with additional capabilities to respond to 
threats in the Asia Pacific region, while ensuring an increased capacity to mitigate 
cyberthreats to its own critical infrastructure.   
2. Developing Capacity with Taiwan 
A defense of Taiwan against mainland aggression is the one contingency 
in the western Pacific Ocean in which success for the United States hinges 
upon the speed of its response and the ability of the military to arrive on 
station with sufficient force to defend Taiwan adequately.205 
a. Cyber Cooperation with Taiwan: Historical Perspective 
Since 2004, the United States has engaged in policy-level discussions with 
Taiwan on cybersecurity primarily as a means to support Taiwanese critical 
infrastructure.206  The priority placed on cybersecurity and critical infrastructure 
protection in the ensuing years has varied by and within Taiwanese administrations. 
Recent national elections saw the moderate Kuomintang (KMT) retain control of both the 
executive and legislative branches of the Taiwanese government, firmly demonstrating 
popular support for KMT policies that are summarized as being more conciliatory toward 
Mainland China. Those polices place a greater emphasis on economic engagement and a 
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maintenance of the status quo vice an agenda for greater international independence.207  
Increased ties with the Chinese mainland, demonstrated through political and economic 
improvements, has resulted in an apparent downgrading in the level of urgency by which 
Taiwan seeks to develop cybersecurity cooperation with likeminded nations. This has 
resulted in a duality of sorts, wherein Taiwan appears mindful of the need for greater 
engagement, but reluctant to conduct activities that may be translated as antagonistic 
toward their larger policy goals. This issue most likely has a limiting effect on the 
development of cooperation for cybersecurity issues between the United States and 
Taiwan as it lies within the backdrop of any policy-level discussion. 
b. Cyber Cooperation with Taiwan: Contemporary Period, Cyber 
Storm 2012   
The 2012 Cyber Storm IV event included a decision to omit foreign 
observers beyond the traditional U.S. allies of AUSCANNZUKUS. This was a drastic 
change from previous Cyber Storm events that had grown to include participation from 
30 nations.208  International participation in the 2012 event will be limited as a means to 
focus on findings developed from previous years and to further develop tangible solutions 
vice explore strategic problems. While this change precluded foreign participation and 
observation, it has not ruled out future participation. Rather, this decision expressed a 
desire by the United States to afford U.S. participants with a maximum ability to work 
issues independent of competing inputs.209  As an active global leader in international 
cybersecurity development, the United States will most likely continue international 
outreach via the Cyber Storm event once it has taken the time to absorb and implement 
the lessons learned from previous years. 
Regarding Taiwan, there is not a concern by DHS or the State Department 
with Taiwan’s future participation in Cyber Storm, nor is aggravating the PRC a concern 
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or issue that has been expressed by the lead U.S. agencies.210  International participation 
in Cyber Storm is the culmination of a developed relationship between the United States 
and participant nations; it is not the beginning relationship development.211  As such, it is 
likely that Taiwan would need to take initial steps through coordination with the 
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) prior to inclusion in any Cyber Storm event. Building 
a stronger Cyber Storm in the future would most likely entertain Taiwanese participation 
and input once these precursor steps have been met.  
c. Legal Concerns: U.S. Law and Titles 
There are not currently any insurmountable legal barriers that preclude the 
United States from cooperating with Taiwan on security matters. Rather, complications 
include policy and priority issues that lead to engagement with some states over others. 
As countries experience an increase in the frequency of cyberattack they also gain a 
better appreciation for the pain of hostile cyber activities. In this context, international 
law enforcement cooperation has developed quicker than other forms of collaboration. 
Such cooperation has resulted in increased capacity to conduct cross-border 
investigations, make arrests and prosecute cyber criminals;212 however, the mitigation of 
cyberespionage has generally not been enhanced by these efforts. Mitigating 
cyberespionage—a crime that generally only affects the state or corporation upon which 
it is committed—has largely remained outside the confines of state-state cooperation. In 
addition to these international barriers, the culture of secrecy observed by 
counterintelligence professionals often prevents increased cooperation between states. 
The national decision maker is therefore left to seek other avenues of capacity 
development to improve the mitigation of cyberespionage. This poses an interesting 
question vis-à-vis developing international cooperation: in what areas could U.S.-Taiwan 
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cyber cooperation expand, and how would such increases equate to advancements in 
counterintelligence effectiveness for mitigating cyberespionage? 
d. Overall Model for Mil-Mil Cyber Cooperation 
Developing a decision-making model to address the larger issue of state-
to-state cooperation can also evaluate the initial underpinnings of the question posed 
above. Within the Department of Defense mil-mil cyber cooperation with any country is 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. The level of cooperation a state receives from the 
United States is based primarily on five considerations: 
 1) Level of Cyber Awareness and Development:  Focused on legal structures, 
organizations and policies that govern cyber activities. Immature capacity in this regard 
equates to a different level of cooperation from the United States, one that does not 
include complex arrangements or partnership on cybersecurity issues.213 
 2) Level of Cybersecurity or CND:  Focused on the state’s capabilities and 
implementation of a competent cybersecurity and network defense posture. Nations with 
poor security, immature cyber defense practices or weak capacity to protect their 
networks obtain a separate level of exchange with U.S. decision makers.214   
 3) Level of Perceived FIS Penetration or Threat:  A separate criteria to evaluate 
the cybersecurity or CND of a candidate state. A country deemed high risk for 
penetration by a concerned foreign intelligence service becomes a problematic candidate 
for detailed or sensitive exchange on cybersecurity matters.215  
 4) Intent for Cooperation with the United States:  This is used as a means to 
evaluate the intent by which another state seeks cyber cooperation. This also includes 
analysis that enhanced capabilities could someday be used against the United States.216    
 5) Benefit for United States:  Basic cost benefit formula derived by evaluating 
cost and time juxtaposed to the benefits received. United States policy experts are in high 
demand regarding capacity development issues and do not have time or resources to 
pursue cooperation avenues with unclear benefit to U.S. security.217   
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3. Applying the Model to Taiwan 
Using the model referenced in the previous section to determine the feasibility of 
cyber cooperation with Taiwan provides important inputs to the decision making process. 
Each of the following five considerations can be assigned a value of low, moderate or 
high depending on an assessment of supporting evidence for each element. Taken in 
aggregate form, these values provide overall assessment for the feasibility of increased 
cyber cooperation with Taiwan and allow a more precise supposition for cybersecurity 
capacity development as a whole.   
a. Assessing Taiwan’s Level of Cyber Awareness and Development   
(1) Legal Structures. Taiwan has an adequate legal foundation by 
which to address cybersecurity issues and has developed and implemented effective laws 
that govern cyberspace. In 2003, the Legislative Yuan enacted a new chapter to Taiwan’s 
Criminal Code that addresses cybercrime (Chapter 36 Articles 358–363). According to an 
assessment conducted by Microsoft, Taiwan has enacted robust computer security laws 
that have resulted in favorable alignment with the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime. This assessment found that Taiwan’s computer security laws are most 
strongly aligned in the areas of: illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, 
system interference, misuse of devices, computer-related forgery and computer-related 
fraud.218   
Taiwan does not have a standalone cyberespionage statute. Rather, 
cyberespionage is investigated as violations of Chapter 36 Articles 358 and 359.219  
Article 358 deals with illegal intrusions and can be applied to government, corporate and 
individuals’ computers. Article 359 deals with the unauthorized alteration of computers 
and likewise can be applied to the same users. Both laws were initially developed in an 
effort to combat hackers,220 but have since been assimilated to investigate and prosecute 
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cyberespionage cases as violations of Taiwanese law. In addition to these cyber related 
offenses, additional changes can be brought against individuals involved in 
cyberespionage under Taiwan’s national security laws that regulate standard espionage 
violations, specifically, Chapter 2 Article 109, which addresses the passage of state 
secrets to a foreign government.221  Overall, Taiwan’s current criminal statues adequately 
allow law enforcement the authority to investigate and arrest cyber criminals and to 
mitigate cyberespionage, which provides an overall high assessment for Taiwan’s legal 
capacity. 
(2) Organizations. Cybercrime that involves personal property, 
identity, e-commerce, prostitution, child pornography and violation of individual liberties 
are generally investigated by the Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) of the National 
Police Agency (NPA) of Taiwan.222  When these crimes rise to a threshold that impairs 
national security they are referred for further investigation to the Ministry of Justice 
Investigation Bureau (MJIB). This process works similarly to the federal versus local or 
state level of jurisdiction within the United States, with the MJIB being most analogous 
to the FBI. National security investigations on behalf of the MJIB typically involve major 
money-laundering, narcotics, anti-corruption, financial and espionage cases. However, 
when cyberespionage is determined or alleged to have emanated from another country, 
then MJIB corroborates in a subordinate capacity with the National Security Bureau 
(NSB) for further investigation.223  Cyberespionage in these cases generally includes the 
theft of intellectual property from Taiwanese corporations or theft of state secrets via 
cyber means.   
Taiwan recognizes that cybercrime is a major threat to domestic 
and international security. As part of this assessment the government of Taiwan has 
prioritized the development of its own internal capacity and sought broader engagement 
with international partners. As part of its domestic efforts, Taiwan established a 
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Crimecrime Investigation Unit (CIU), a division within the MJIB that is responsible for 
the investigation and coordination of cyber incidents.224  In 2007, the MJIB established a 
National Cyber Forensics Laboratory at its Headquarters in Taipei. The CIB of the NPA 
also established its own cyber lab and a CIU, which is responsible for cybercrimes within 
their jurisdiction. This development included the placement of a CIU within each county 
level NPA station.225  In addition to these structural improvements, the government of 
Taiwan has assigned special prosecutors within the Ministry of Justice to streamline 
cybercrime prosecutions for criminal and national security cases.226   
On the international front, Taiwan has established an International 
Criminal Investigations Brigade (ICIB) within the CIB. ICIB has become the principal 
authority for transnational criminal investigations related to Taiwan.227  Taiwan also 
participates in Interpol and has participated in the High Technology Crime Investigation 
Conference hosted by the FBI in Quantico, VA.228  In 2006, an MJIB delegation of cyber 
investigators attended a two-day forensic workshop sponsored by the Massachusetts’ 
State Police and the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office.229  Attendance at this 
event sought to further develop forensic cyber investigative knowledge and bring best 
practices back to Taiwan.   
Apart from Taiwan’s law enforcement efforts to combat 
cybercrime, its Ministry of National Defense (MND) J6 also plays a central role in 
cybersecurity.230  While Taiwan does not have an analog to USCYBERCOM, MND J6 
would be its closest comparison. Although little is known about the capacity of this unit, 
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MND J6 employs Taiwan’s primary CND capability. Overall, due to Taiwan’s 
substantial level of development for combating cybercrime within its law enforcement 
and judicial departments, combined with an unknown but established unit to conduct 
CND within the MND J6, Taiwan’s organizational capacity for cybercrime investigation 
and prosecution is regarded as high.   
(3) Policies. Taiwan has instituted a number of polices that have 
led to an increased capacity to protect state secrets and to harden national security 
communication infrastructures. The MND utilizes an air-gaped “Intranet” similar in 
function to DoD’s Sipernet231 and a system of secure voice using an encryption algorithm 
to ensure voice communication is transported securely between users.232  Additionally, 
Taiwan institutes a firm set of policies that regulate the handling of sensitive and 
classified information.233  For its attention to security and implementation of hardware 
and policies that regulate protection of sensitive information, Taiwan constitutes a level 
policy development and awareness assessed as moderate to high. 
b. Assessing Taiwan’s Current CND Capacity   
The sensitive nature of this subject has made assessment of the Taiwan’s 
government capacity for CND difficult. However, inferences from other areas of 
Taiwan’s CND posture can be made to assess its overall capacity in this regard. These 
tangential areas include corporate, education and commercial sectors. In April 2010, 
Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan strengthened its information technology laws with passage of 
a revised Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA). The purpose of the revision was to 
mandate compliance by corporations and individuals in the handling, collection and 
safeguarding of personal data.234  The PDPA created a standardized process in Taiwan 
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for the protection of personal data that compels all industries, universities and 
commercial entities to pass a certification process in order to remain in compliance with 
the law.235  There appears to be a great deal of speculation regarding the enforcement of 
this law, but the intent behind its implementation signifies the clear understanding of a 
government that wants Taiwanese corporations and individuals to pay more attention to 
the defense of information security. 
New policies and the passage of laws that strengthen information security 
governance show a strong understanding of the cybersecurity threat environment in 
Taiwan. The assessed level of CND support instituted by large Taiwanese corporations is 
high. However, there appears to be a significant gap between these large entities and 
companies that constitute the medium to small end of the spectrum. This gap presents a 
significant problem to Taiwan business development and creates an overall permissive 
environment for malicious computer activity. Contributing factors for this capability gap 
mostly includes the high cost of CND implementation due to a minimal presence of 
domestic technical expertise.236  Currently, Taiwan has three major deficits in its 
commercial CND structure that cannot be filled by domestic support alone; they are:  
 1) Digital Identification Services: E-commerce identification solutions.237 
 2) Insurance Mechanisms: Protection of companies from liability if consumer data 
is mishandled or breached.238 
 3) Total Solution Providers: Taiwan has a limited amount of companies who can 
act as total solution providers and a strong demand for such services.239   
Taiwan needs affordable solutions to address these three problem areas in 
order to bring its small and medium companies in line with current CND processes. 
American companies willing to develop services to fulfill these needs would be greatly 
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welcomed in Taiwan.240  Addressing these areas would provide a significant boost in 
Taiwan’s overall CND posture, and improve its rating. An aggregate assessment of 
Taiwan’s CND capacity thus incorporates an understanding of its current gaps coupled 
with an assumption that its high capacity to implement legal, organizational and policy 
initiatives in the protection of its cyber infrastructure (covered previously) determines 
that Taiwan has developed at least a moderate capacity in the CND arena.         
c. Taiwan’s Ability to Mitigate FIS Penetration   
A series of recent espionage arrests and convictions has produced great 
concern over Taiwan’s level of FIS penetration. In January 2011, Major General Lo 
Hsien-che was arrested and charged for committing espionage on behalf of the PRC in 
what has been described as “the most prominent espionage case in Taiwan in 
decades.”241  Lo was later found guilty and sentenced to life in prison by a Taiwanese 
military court. Since Lo’s arrest, three other Taiwanese have been separately arrested and 
charged on espionage statues for providing national defense related information to 
China.242  These cases signify a high degree of intelligence penetration within Taiwan’s 
national security establishment and China’s continued priority to collect C4ISR related 
information within Taiwan despite improved political relations.243  The prevalence of 
these cases reveals a possible increase in the effectiveness of Taiwan’s 
counterintelligence capabilities; however, a consequence of this frequency also depicts a 
level of PRC intelligence penetration that is most likely deeper than what has been 
exposed. Taken together, this analysis suggests that Taiwan’s level of FIS penetration is 
high.  
This sequence of spy scandals has produced a realization by Taiwan’s 
decision makers that Taiwan needs to improve its counterintelligence efforts to limit the 
effects of Chinese espionage. President Ma has called for Taiwan to “actively prevent” 
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Chinese espionage though strengthened defensive counterintelligence efforts.244  
Highlighting these efforts includes new policies that institute travel restrictions for retired 
National Security Bureau (NSB) personnel wishing to travel to China and the 
development of reporting requirements for military members who are engaged in 
romantic relationships with Chinese nationals.245  In a recent example, a Taiwanese 
fighter pilot was disciplined for having “improper conduct” with a female reporter from 
China National Radio. In response to the incident, the MND released a statement saying, 
“[t]he ministry continues to strengthen its anti-spying mechanism to prevent Chinese 
communists from prying on our military intelligence.”246  Thus, despite the high level of 
perceived foreign intelligence penetration, Taiwan appears to be taking action to enhance 
its counterintelligence efforts and limit its exposure to Chinese espionage.     
Exacerbating Taiwan’s espionage problem is the ease by which Chinese 
Intelligence has been able to use ideology to recruit Taiwanese spies. A shared national 
identity between China and Taiwan indicates that Taiwanese identity politics play a 
central role in these espionage recruitments. While current polling shows a trend in the 
growth of an independent Taiwanese identity, 247 the interdependence created from 
amicable commercial and political policies appears to have produced a mindset for many 
in Taiwan that China is no longer a grave threat. Enhanced suitability in this context 
limits Taiwan’s ability to mitigate its exposure to espionage from the Chinese mainland 
despite encouraging signs that the Government of Taiwan is instituting policies and 
enhancing its counterintelligence capabilities. As such, this analysis concludes that 
Taiwan’s high level of assessed FIS penetration is due to a PRC proclivity to use 
espionage as a means to gain insight into Taiwanese politics and produce military 
advantage, coupled with an increased suitability from a shared national identity.   
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d. Taiwan’s Motivation for Increased Cooperation   
It is highly probable that Taiwan would attach more value to political 
gains from increased cooperation with the United States than they would from tangible 
defense upgrades. For Taiwan, capability increases often pale in comparison to the 
political messages that accompany such procurements. In this vein, continued demands 
for U.S. flag level officer visits, acquisition of F-16 C/D fighter aircraft, or diesel 
submarines are all viewed for their significant political vice capability enhancement 
value. In this regard, it is likely that Taiwan would seek a public announcement of 
increased cyber cooperation as a means to provide a political message to the Chinese 
mainland. This political message could be intended to deter Chinese cyber aggression 
while signaling increased ties with the United States. However, such a political message 
has consequences that could alter the calculus of Taiwan’s willingness to engage in 
bilateral cyber cooperation with the United States altogether.   
In the current political environment, a political message signifying 
increased cyber cooperation with the United States is aggressive and not congruent with 
the state of conciliatory political discourse between China and Taiwan.248  As such, it is 
assessed that although there would be political pressure to publicly announce increased 
cyber cooperation with the United States to gain deterrent value, such cooperation would 
be downplayed by the Taiwanese in the current political environment. This is not to 
assume that Taiwan would always restrain a broadcast of increased CND capabilities. 
Domestic political pressure could become an important element in such a disclosure if 
hostile cyber activity emanating from China continues or worsens in the years ahead. 
Additionally, such announcements could have second and third order effects for other 
U.S. strategic partners in the region.249  Thus, while there are tangible benefits for 
Taiwan to seek greater cyber cooperation with the United States, calculations regarding 
the public acknowledgment of such increases will most likely remain Taiwan’s primary 
considerations when evaluating increased cyber cooperation with the United States.  
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e. Benefit for the United States  
Determining the benefit for increased cyber cooperation with Taiwan to 
the United States involves a basic risk vs. reward calculus. As stated previously, at the 
U.S. policy-decision maker level, cooperation on cybersecurity issues with Taiwan is not 
constrained by concern over PRC reactions.250  As such, any reluctance on behalf of the 
United States is about the balance of risk versus reward. Thus, the same calculus used to 
evaluate broadened U.S. engagement for any nation also applies to Taiwan.     
(1) Reward Analysis. In 2010, while he was still the Secretary of 
Defense, Robert Gates wrote in Foreign Affairs that the United States needs to focus on 
“building partner capacity,” which he defined as “helping other countries defend 
themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with 
equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance.”251  Building partner capacity 
with Taiwan proposes that the United States explores how to help Taiwan help itself. In 
the realm of cybersecurity, developing closer cooperation on cyber issues is therefore, a 
benefit to the U.S. policy agenda as it supports an increased indigenous capacity for 
Taiwan to defend against unwanted military, economic and political influence. 
Furthermore, the United States has a fundamental desire for Taiwan to maintain a 
capacity to defend itself against kinetic and cyberattack derived from within China.252  
This includes cyber actions that produce political coercion as a means to influence 
Taiwanese policy. Developing cooperative cybersecurity with Taiwan, therefore fulfills 
U.S. policy regarding building partner capacity, while at the same time produces a more 
independent Taiwanese capacity to resist PRC coercion. 
There are also non-political rewards for developing a more robust 
cyber cooperation agenda with Taiwan. Since Taiwan shares many of the same 
cyberspace threats as the United States, it is reasonable to conclude that their law 
enforcement and national security apparatus maintains knowledge that could enhance 
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U.S. cybersecurity capabilities. Developing a mutually beneficial relationship with 
Taiwan in this regard could likely provide a mechanism by which new cyber exploitation 
tools, zero-day exploits, phishing attempts, computer viruses and even attribution 
information could be learned by the United States. USCI currently expends a great  
deal of resources within stove-piped organizations in an attempt to better understand 
these issues. Enhancing cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan could enhance 
counterintelligence effectiveness and address efficiency concerns in a fiscally constrained 
environment. Regarding the latter, leveraging Taiwanese knowledge becomes a force 
multiplier, which is an attractive element as USCI agencies weigh effectiveness against 
limited resources. Given these advantages, the inquiry regarding increased cooperation 
with Taiwan becomes less about what the United States gains and more about how to 
balance several inherent risks.   
(2) Risks Analysis. The United States benefits from cyber 
cooperation with Taiwan through an increased ability to fulfill U.S. policy vis-à-vis 
building partner capacity; however, the risk incurred from such development is more 
opaque. The United States should be concerned about the level of the perceived FIS 
penetration in Taiwan, and how this equates to increased vulnerability of U.S. plans, 
intentions and capabilities for building partner capacity. However, if cybersecurity 
cooperation can be conducted while addressing the FIS concern, then this threat becomes 
rather subdued. The DoD Operating in Cyberspace document indicates that as a means to 
increase cybersecurity, the DoD will institute best practices of “cyber hygiene,” those 
activities that seek to protect user data and ensure both software and operating systems 
are up to date.253  Sharing these best practices with international partners is a simple 
cooperative step toward building trust and enhancing future cooperation. Helping Taiwan 
to help itself in this regard is simply the development of standards that would allow 
Taiwan an ability to more adequately protect their own infrastructure while not providing 
a capability that—if provided to another nation—would result in increased U.S. 
vulnerability. 
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It is most likely that the United States is more concerned about 
near-term events than those in the distant future. As such, international cooperation that 
results in a foreign nation receiving increased capacity is not necessarily weighted against 
how such increases could be used against the United States in the future. Applied to 
Taiwan, this analysis indicates small increases that produce better standards of cyber 
hygiene would not produce concern for how such capacity developments could someday 
be used against the United States. As such, if initial cyber cooperation is limited, then the 
threat of China obtaining increased capabilities through subversion or unification should 
not factor into the decision making process.   
This approach toward developing cybersecurity cooperation with 
Taiwan is a short term trust building exercise that could expand as each partner 
demonstrates its commitment to enhancing the others cybersecurity posture. If such an 
expansion were to occur, then increased cooperation would have to be levied against 
concerns that capacity may be transferred to the PRC. While this concern is important to 
note, it may not be as large a factor in the decision making process as it first appears. 
Seen from a similar perspective, this same concern has not stopped the U.S. from 
engaging in the sale of military equipment and weapons to Taiwan. These sales clearly 
provide capacity increases to Taiwan that if transferred through subversion or unification, 
would increase the PRC’s capacity as well. Using the foreign military sales angle to shed 
light on the risk versus reward dynamic for increased cyber cooperation poses an 
interesting question; is there something inherent in cyberspace that changes the calculus 
or otherwise prohibits application of the foreign military sales model to cyber 
cooperation? 
Any assessment detailing the continued sale of military weapons 
and equipment to Taiwan in support of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 must include 
domestic political concerns. While these concerns can be ideological—in that the United 
States supports democratic nations—the more significant rationale includes the economic 
benefit to the defense industrial base. As such, congressional representatives whose 
constituents profit financially from the sale of military goods to Taiwan are likely to press 
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for continued deals despite the risks involved. Assimilating this dynamic to assess the 
risks for increased cyber cooperation produces similar but different outcomes.   
The primary difference between foreign military sales (FMS) and 
increased cybersecurity cooperation is that the cyber component has no constituent 
interest in the United States and thus, lacks a critical component for overriding inherent 
risk. In addition, the FMS model appears to mitigate risk by selling Taiwan less than 
cutting-edge military hardware. This is evident in FMS that includes Kidd, vice Arleigh 
Burke class destroyers and F-16s, vice F-22s. This poses a question regarding the degree 
to which the United States could provide second rate cyber capability enhancements 
while it desires first rate information in return. A proper analysis of this question must 
take into consideration that second rate capability enhancements are most likely not 
adequate within the current cyber environment. This is due in large part to the speed at 
which cyberspace technologies advance. Thus, for any degree of substantial capacity 
enhancement to be meaningful, the United States would likely have to include first rate 
cyber defense hardware, software and know-how in order maintain a viable level of 
cooperation. Unlike FMS, overcoming the risks inherent with this level of capability 
enhancement would not be mitigated by constituent interests. As such, proving the 
feasibility of cooperation in micro-areas of cyber capacity development would likely 
need to be attained before cyber cooperation could expand.  
4. Increased Cyber Cooperation from the Taiwanese Perspective 
Understanding what increased cybersecurity cooperation means from the 
Taiwanese perspective provides a more solid foundation from which, to amply assess the 
feasibility of increased cooperation as a whole. Taiwan has signed a number of criminal 
related Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with foreign governments in Europe, 
Asia and the Americas, but these agreements typically only address traditional crimes 
such as money laundering, human trafficking and child indecency.254  Taiwan seeks 
broader international partnerships to address a host of other criminal issues, but it 
recognizes that its geopolitical situation impedes effectiveness and limits the potential for 
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expansion. Taiwan’s national leaders believe “the lack of formal channels for Taiwan 
cybercrime investigators to communicate with other countries’ law enforcement agencies 
hinders effective investigation.”255  In an effort to establish a more secure society, 
Taiwan’s purpose for international law enforcement engagement appears geared toward 
the solidification of relationships, channels or forums through which it can effectively 
mitigate crime within its own borders. 
Taiwan’s geopolitical status further prevents basic cooperation in other areas of 
cybercrime mitigation. While Taiwanese investigators are able to obtain law enforcement 
related information from foreign Internet companies that maintain offices in Taiwan 
(Yahoo, Microsoft and Google), they are unable to acquire information when acts are 
conducted via services that do not have representation in Taiwan (Facebook and 
Twitter).256  To counter this deficit, Taiwan maintains liaison relationships with the FBI 
and U.S. Secret Service, but the closest representatives of these agencies reside in Hong 
Kong. This geographic separation and the lack of established formal channels has 
resulted in sporadic and untimely requests for assistance.257  Taiwan’s motivation for 
increased cyber cooperation therefore, seeks to change this dynamic by establishing 
formal channels of cooperation through signed MOUs for cybersecurity.   
Proposed parameters for such an MOU would include the sharing of cybersecurity 
information, procedures for effective cybercrime investigation, training of Taiwanese 
officers by U.S. experts in workshop formats, sharing standard operating procedures and 
jointly developing best practices.258  Taiwan is further motived to “establish cooperative 
platforms” by which direct connections or taskforce style relations can be established.259  
Such information sharing could ultimately include Taiwan providing the United States 
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with knowledge of new viruses, zero-day exploits, identification of hacker groups and 
individual hackers and possibly even attribution of individuals involved in 
cyberespionage.  
5. International Level Restructuring, Conclusion 
The quote referenced at the beginning of this chapter by Austin Matschulat in 
1969 has profound applications for addressing counterintelligence effectiveness today. As 
the national security decision maker looks to balance increased effectiveness with the risk 
that accompanies developing and maintaining international partnerships, it becomes 
necessary to adopt a responsible strategy to afford the development and maintenance of 
liaison relationships. For the USCI community historically, it has been easier to avoid 
such relationships than to seek ways that provide for effective mitigation of risk in the 
pursuit of added counterintelligence capacity. However, analysis presented in this chapter 
delineates a path by which the risk of engaging in developing greater cooperation with 
Taiwan can be minimized in the short term, and possibly even the long term if trust and 
mutual benefit can be established. 
Working to improve Taiwan’s cyber hygiene serves as a risk-neutral micro-
approach to building cyber cooperation and could serve as an initial step in developing 
the trust needed for more robust cyber cooperation in the future. Although the United 
States must balance international cooperation priorities, the national cyberthreat clearly 
necessities that non-traditional approaches be fully considered and evaluated for potential 
gains. The model of cyber cooperation presented in this chapter and applied to Taiwan, 
indicates that Taiwan would be an ideal candidate for increased cooperation if its 
assessed level of FIS penetration can be mitigated. While this factor is a significant and 
potentially insurmountable barrier, initial cyber cooperation could be developed that 
mitigates this threat as a means to develop trust and set a precedent for mutually 
beneficial exchange. Improving Taiwan’s level of awareness through joint exchanges and 
sharing of cyber hygiene best practices could result in an increased CND capability 
within Taiwan, which could positively impact its ability to mitigate FIS penetration.   
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Taiwan’s motivation for desiring increased cyber cooperation is apparent. Taiwan 
seeks political empowerment through publically announced increases in cooperation with 
the United States on a variety of issues; however, there remains a strong voice within 
Taiwan’s decision making body that such announcements could complicate cross-strait 
developments.260  This concern indicates that growing cyber cooperation from the initial 
cyber hygiene steps proposed in this chapter may encounter political challenges. This 
concern could produce a need for cyber cooperation to take on a law enforcement or 
commercial sector undertone in the future, vice an overt U.S. policy one. Movement in 
this direction would find Taiwan less motivated to seek political gains and more 
interested in tangible cybersecurity improvements. This would be a positive 
transformation in Taiwanese strategic thinking as Taiwan has an imperative to develop 
law enforcement liaison relationships that result in less vulnerability to a variety of 
transnational crimes. Thus, while Taiwan’s motivations are mixed between political and 
tangible capacity increases, it is likely that both desires can serve U.S. policy and 
counterintelligence priorities. 
The United States ultimately benefits from increased cooperation with Taiwan if 
the initial phases of cyber cooperation can be developed within a framework that 
circumvents risk. Developing formal law enforcement channels that institutionalize a 
process for joint cybersecurity development, information sharing and risk management 
would provide the United States with a means to fulfill Secretary Gates’ concept of 
developing partner capacity. Secondarily, increasing cyber cooperation with Taiwan 
affords the United States a political message of its own; namely, that if the PRC cannot 
adequately curtail cybercrime emanating from within its borders, then U.S. decision 
makers will be forced to develop cooperative relationships that China believes are 
contrary to its own interests. Finally, utilizing a micro-approach to set the scene for a 
larger cooperative relationship with Taiwan could prove valuable as a means to increase 
counterintelligence effectiveness through the provision of early-warning for new 
computer viruses, zero-day exploits, exploitation tools and possibly even attribution at 
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the state or individual level. Arriving at this point is not an overnight process, but the 
potential gains certainly compel the initiation of these first steps.   
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V. CONCLUSION, APPLYING THE FINDINGS 
Addressing counterintelligence effectiveness in the United States has long been a 
neglected topic that has resulted in many misconceptions and few suggestions regarding 
how to create a unified counterintelligence enterprise. This gap in knowledge has much to 
do with New Institutionalist concepts that stress the importance of culture and initial 
agency development. Counterintelligence professionals practice a strict culture of 
secrecy, and they should, but this concept permeates into other areas of the discipline that 
do not require such safeguarding. This thesis explored this concept, namely, through the 
adequate restructuring of counterintelligence toward building a stronger capacity to 
mitigate cyberespionage. Drawing lessons learned from a case study of the April 2007 
cyberattack on Estonia and the international community’s ensuing attempts to ensure 
cyberspace, this thesis developed an initial baseline for addressing the issues of 
cyberespionage. It has determined that the cyberespionage threat to American national 
security—explored via cases that targeted the U.S. Department of Defense, defense 
industrial base and the commercial sector—is prolific and requires immediate attention 
from the nation’s national security establishment. 
Mitigating this threat is a significant challenge for today’s national security 
decision maker, especially in light of the fact that the current USCI community is not 
properly structured. Removing stove-pipes, minimizing redundancies and engaging non-
traditional international partners are techniques proposed in this thesis that together 
constitute micro-level changes for implementation in the short term. These structural 
changes take into account the current fiscal environment and evolving U.S. policy 
decision to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.261  These findings not only provide 
effectiveness and efficiency alternatives for the current environment, but if proven 
successful they could institute larger changes for both the U.S. counterintelligence 
community and provide direction for DoD policy makers. Instituting micro-level 
structural changes enhances the national security posture of the United States by allowing 
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additional means for the U.S. military to retain its technological superiority and for U.S. 
companies to maintain their competitive advantage. Finally, refocusing USCI efforts 
toward building international partner capacity acts as a force multiplier in combating 
cybercrime and could produce increased effectiveness for mitigating cyberespionage 
from an operational and political perspective.   
A. NEW INSTITUTIONALISM APPLIED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Using a New Institutionalist approach to examine the culture of secrecy 
surrounding counterintelligence determines that internal agency predilections against 
intelligence sharing impedes domestic and international cooperation. Nations do not 
generally like to share intelligence of any sort unless they are close allies and even then, 
there are strong rules that govern the level and nature of the information shared. There is 
a rational reason for this as sensitive operations can sometimes be compromised by 
expanding the circle of knowledge beyond those who need to know. However, 
operational details notwithstanding, there are areas for intelligence sharing that do not 
threaten current operations or undermine national policy decisions. In these areas, 
counterintelligence cooperation should be stressed between like-minded nations where 
capacity developments can lead to increased effectiveness.   
Counterintelligence—as a subset of intelligence—is mostly concerned with the 
investigation and mitigation of the crime of espionage. A standard technique for reducing 
crime includes law enforcement liaison between similarly affected nations as a means to 
develop cooperative techniques and share threat information. However, 
counterintelligence’s culture of secrecy limits the means available for effective reduction 
of cyberespionage, as it generally prohibits law enforcement liaison between like-minded 
nations. This analysis does not suggest that operational details need to be shared between 
nations; after all such sharing could be abused or lead to the divulgence of intelligence 
sources and methods. Rather, the culture of secrecy unnecessarily prevents cooperation 
that should be focused on capacity development toward areas of common interest. 
Capacity building could focus on sharing trend analysis, developing a common threat 
picture, training or exploring joint defensive means to protect common interests.   
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Additionally, the counterintelligence culture protects it from oversight controls 
that should demand accountability for effectiveness. Those who fall outside this subset of 
government service are rarely given a true optic through which to gauge its effect on 
national security. Therefore, counterintelligence oversight in the United States becomes a 
process to ensure the enforcement of rules that protect civil liberties and financial 
resources from being abused. Neither congressional nor executive oversight is designed 
to adequately judge the true level of counterintelligence effectiveness,262 because neither 
branch of government has the institutional knowledge to properly gauge what 
effectiveness really looks like. As such, oversight serves an accountability measure to 
ensure the protection of institutional reputations and observance of U.S. law.  
This analysis places an emphasis on the need to create mechanisms through which 
counterintelligence can prove its value to the national security decision maker and allow 
for an adequate level of judgment about counterintelligence effectiveness. However, this 
cannot be achieved without first addressing the structural issues that prevent 
counterintelligence from becoming an indispensable force for sustaining national 
security. Creating true unity of effort across the USCI enterprise toward mitigating 
cyberespionage is therefore, a means to accomplish this goal.  
Another New Institutionalist problem is that federal employees often face one 
reform effort after another due to the perceived need of decision makers to start anew 
with each change of leadership. These reforms often lead to confusion, waste and the 
setting of priorities that are shifted once political winds change.263 Taken together, the 
large macro-approaches to reform generally add bureaucratic layers by creating new 
administrative hurdles. In fact, this onslaught of reform initiatives has contributed to the 
government’s reputation for administrative inertia vice operational effectiveness.264  The 
last major overhaul generally regarded as successful was the GWN Act of 1986. 
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However, opponents of GWN cited concern that an over-centralized bureaucracy would 
diminish the role of the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs.265  While they were 
proven incorrect, a favorable domestic political climate and a media willing to advance 
the topic to the American people were important aspects of the reform’s success.  
These factors are lacking within the USCI reorganization environment today, 
leaving the decision maker to search for small-scale efforts that can prove successful at 
improving effectiveness over time. A micro-restructuring model would not require the 
large-scale political capital demonstrated during GWN and would be based on authorities 
already within the institutions targeted for reform. Micro-level changes are easier to 
institute because they typically involve only one or two agencies and when taken 
together, can result in large-scale capability increases.  
B. ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR REFORM WITHIN DEFENSE 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
Various national security policy documents covered in this thesis address the need 
for increased counterintelligence effectiveness to mitigate cyberespionage. Yet, the stove-
piped and parochial nature of counterintelligence in the United States provides no forcing 
mechanism by which these agencies need comply. The Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive is perhaps the best situated to develop such mechanisms, 
but current policy generated from this national coordination authority has no real 
influence. The ONCIX can suggest and even pretend to influence the three core areas of 
counterintelligence hiring, training and personnel development through career paths, but 
they have no means to compel the services to actually develop such practices.   
The fact of the matter is that without a forcing mechanism, NCIS will continue to 
hire based on its core mission of civilian law enforcement, AFOSI will look for qualified 
officers within its ranks and bright enlisted personnel who test well enough to earn the 
most coveted training in federal law enforcement, and Army CI will continue to buck the 
trend and utilize a preponderance of military personal to perform the core competencies 
of CI within its department. This report recognizes that these differences are inadequate 
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for DoD CI as a whole and that the cultural variance between these organizations 
prevents the development of a true DoD CI enterprise. As such, a forcing mechanism is 
needed; developing one within DoD instead of relying on ONCIX to gain the authority 
necessary to control budgets, hiring practices, training or career paths is the most 
effective means of producing the unity of effort required to mitigate threats to national 
security.   
Furthermore, this thesis recognizes that national security agencies evolve 
differently than domestic policy departments. Amy Zegart succinctly points out this 
distinction: 
In domestic policy, interest groups and their legislative supporters take the 
lead in shaping agency design and operations. The action takes place 
mostly in Congress. But in national security affairs, presidents and 
bureaucrats are the primary players, battling over agency structure far 
away from the capitol steps.266   
Her distinction rests primarily on the fact that domestic policy has a constituency that law 
makers must appease, while national security has no such body to represent it. However, 
cyberespionage changes this dynamic in that it too, has a domestic policy base 
represented by the corporations whose bottom lines are affected from the loss of 
proprietary information or strengthened competition based on stolen product designs. 
Thus, counterintelligence reform intended to increase effectiveness in mitigating the 
national cyberthreat can act more like a domestic policy organization and less like a 
national security agency in that it too, has the support of a constituent bases with 
substantial interest group representation.   
Increasing domestic cooperation among DoD counterintelligence is a practice in 
streamlining effectiveness in a challenging fiscal environment. Minimizing redundancy 
between agencies should be considered a best practice in an era of fiscal restraint. Micro-
restructuring DoD CI by employing the JCIU model within the established COCOM 
JCCs removes stove-pipes that create redundancy and waste by providing a forcing 
mechanism that compels DoD CI agencies to work together toward a common goal. Not 
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only is this level of restructuring easy to accomplish, because it all can take place within 
a single government department, but it provides an additional tool to the CCDR who 
desperately needs to address the cyberespionage threat to their commands.  
C. ADDRESSING THE THREAT FROM CYBERSPACE 
The global community clearly recognizes the criminal, military and intelligence 
threats posed from increased dependence on cyberspace. This thesis has used the 
Estonian case to extrapolate the issues of cyberpower, attribution and the complexities 
surrounding the formation of institutions that seek to prevent cyberattack. Threat 
mitigation techniques that include the establishment of cyber norms, international 
agreements, codes of conduct, ratification or assimilation of laws and attempts to solve 
the attribution problem all require a significant investment in time and resources before 
they can become effective.  
This thesis has determined the difficulty of attribution has become the main 
enabler of cyberthreats. Even efforts to produce an international cyberdomain that 
addresses attribution in Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) has been met with 
complications in its worldwide acceptance and attribution workarounds. IPv6 provides 
the capability of tracking the activity and location of individual devices on networks; 
however, privacy concerns have already produced tools to circumvent the added 
attribution features of this new Internet protocol system.267  Regulating hostile cyber 
activity through international political mechanisms or technological improvement alone 
does not address the current cybersecurity situation. Faced with an existential threat to 
American national security, national leaders do not have the luxury of adopting solutions 
that require such investments of time. 
Instead, the decision maker must embrace decisions that empower national 
security elements to offensively target hostile cyber activity in accordance with U.S. law. 
Reliance on liberal ideals alone to shape international behavior or establish new 
international regimes to regulate cyberespionage is unlikely to achieve desired results. 
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When looking at the breadth of the cyberespionage problem with China, key national 
security advisors have determined that “[t]he potential of cyber space for espionage is so 
overwhelming that it is unrealistic to seek cooperative agreements to govern this part of 
the problem.”268  This recognition, while accurate, has unfortunately produced an 
incorrect policy direction within the current U.S. administration, one that emphasizes 
defense over offensive. The propensity to embrace defense is clearly expressed in the 
June 2009 National Cyberspace Policy Review Security: 
Without major advances in the security of these systems or significant 
change in how they are constructed or operated, it is doubtful that the 
United States can protect itself from the growing threat of cybercrime and 
state-sponsored intrusion and operations. Our digital infrastructure has 
already suffered intrusions that have allowed criminals to steal hundreds 
of millions of dollars and nation-states and other entities to steal 
intellectual property and sensitive military information.269   
This alarmist statement advocates that large structural changes to the Internet or the 
establishment of new government organizations to regulate and curtail malicious cyber 
activity are the necessary solutions to mitigate the current challenges in cyberspace. 
However, such approaches do not take into account fiscal responsibility and they should 
leave the national security decision maker anxious for alternatives that efficiently utilize 
taxpayer dollars. Solutions that employ micro-changes to the existing national security 
infrastructure would be more responsible and could prove more effective in the near term.  
1. The Effect of Cyberspace on Espionage 
The properties of cyberspace have made cyberespionage cheap, easy and low risk 
when compared to the investment, payoff and political blowback from traditional human 
espionage. In this context cyberespionage has become an affordable solution for states 
looking for asymmetric means to balance power. The prevalence of cyberespionage 
presents challenges to the conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence, forcing each to 
change tactics in order to be successful in the current environment. Joel Brenner 
references the need for change as: 
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In an age of mass surveillance and instant electronic storage and retrieval, 
covert espionage operations will never be the same again. The intelligence 
business, like everyone else, now operates in a glass house…You’d have 
to be crazy not to believe that the Pentagon’s top-secret system, JWICS, 
isn’t penetrated.270 
Brenner’s alarming words are supported by the current Director of the NSA’s 
Information Assurance Directorate Debora Plunkett, who confirms that threats from 
cyberspace has fundamentally changed the way the NSA does business, “[t]here is no 
such thing as ‘Secure’ anymore...the most sophisticated adversaries are going to go 
unnoticed on our networks.”271  In light of these assessments the national security 
establishment and commercial sector need to adapt new techniques and empower old 
ones. In the current cyber environment speed, not security, will be considered the main 
defense against cyberespionage.272  Developing an ability to continuously out-innovate, 
bring to market and employ products or weapons systems faster than opponents is the 
only assured way to maintain competitive advantage in both the commercial and defense 
sectors. However, there is one additional component to producing this advantage, the 
ability to vigorously employ a capacity to slow down the competition. Making it difficult 
for the adversary by slowing down their acquisition cycle, becomes one of the primary 
functions of offensive counterintelligence in the cyber dominated environment. 
D. ADDRESSING THE THREAT FROM CHINA 
This thesis has determined that as a realist actor within the international system, 
China has much to gain by partaking in cyberespionage, computer network exploitation 
and the development of a cyberwarfare capability directed at the United States. A study 
of China’s current military doctrine shows the development of asymmetric capabilities 
aimed at degrading the technological advantage of a superior advisory. Writings from 
PLA military officers confirm that developing cyber capacity is recognized as a 
fundamental means for achieving political and military goals.  
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As such, the U.S. decision maker does not need positive attribution before taking 
steps that will improve the defensive and offensive capabilities of the national security 
establishment, to plan for and mitigate attacks derived from within China. A large part of 
this process is to recognize that USCI has a large role to play in the development of these 
capabilities and that its cyber elements need to be effectively organized to best impact its 
mission. This capability increase is not only warranted, but imperative in the current 
political and strategic environment. However, not all proposals suggest such realist 
means for combating the cyberthreat from China.  
Kenneth Lieberthal and Peter Singer have written of the need for constructive 
political dialogue with China as a means to establish normative patterns of behavior that 
will regulate mounting tensions in the U.S.-China relationship over cybersecurity. In 
doing so, they propose an agenda for cooperation that builds upon a realistic recognition 
of the difficulties each nation faces as a basis for discussion and eventual exploration of 
common steps toward the mitigation of hostile cyber activity.273  Their proposal 
consistently states that such an agenda would include a “respect that each government 
will protect its ability to use cyber capabilities to carry out espionage activities and 
support military activities should they become necessary.”274  This proposal clearly seeks 
to obfuscate the fact that a suspicion of Chinese state-directed cyberespionage is perhaps 
one of the leading causes of tension between the two nations. Attempting to isolate 
espionage from the larger issue is not only inconsistent with seeking to determine a viable 
solution, but it grossly misrepresents the structural problems that have caused tensions in 
the first place. 
Such liberal idealism will not suffice to address the realist underpinnings of the 
U.S.-China relationship or create an education of minds and a mutual understanding on 
cybersecurity issues. However, while their proposed solutions are unlikely to achieve 
results, the basis for their analysis is reasonable. The fact of the matter is that “the 
perception is growing at both the popular and elite level in America that the cyberthreat 
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from China, while multifaceted, has a large government-directed component.”275  In 
order to mitigate this threat, or to prove its state-sponsored veracity, a forcing mechanism 
needs to be created that compels DoD CI to develop unity of effort to increase 
effectiveness, derive mitigation techniques and develop intelligence that allows the 
decision maker a clear understanding of the cyberespionage threat posed from within 
China. Attribution becomes a key enabler of U.S. policy in this regard and DoD CI is 
uniquely positioned to answer the attribution question for the policy maker, if provided 
the resources and structural foundation to be effective.  
E. ADDRESSING MICRO-RESTRUCTURING DOMESTICALLY 
President Obama’s International Strategy for Cyberspace document confirms the 
United States will maintain the right to protect itself against attacks in and through 
cyberspace. His policy stated, “[w]hen warranted, the United States will respond to 
hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country.”276  As such, 
the United States reserves the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, 
informational, military and economic—to limit cyberthreats in accordance with 
applicable international law.277  This indicates cyberattacks that cripple the nation’s 
critical infrastructure or military capacity will be treated the same as kinetic attacks that 
have the same effect. Calculating responses to these events therefore, includes the ways 
and means used to respond to more traditional strikes.  
In similar fashion, attacks that pilfer vast amounts of secret or sensitive data from 
defense contractors, American corporations, or DoD systems via traditional espionage 
would be met with swift response from the nation’s counterintelligence enterprise. In the 
cyber realm, assimilating the White House doctrine referenced above necessitates a 
similar unleashing of the nation’s CI enterprise to offensively and defensively mitigate 
the cyberespionage threat. Joel Brenner said this best in his comment that USCI needs “to 
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live inside our adversaries’ networks.”278  His suggestion includes an offensive 
counterintelligence capability and one in which USCI needs to play an active role in 
implementing.  
This analysis does not intend to identify or exclude other elements of the U.S. 
government who are currently engaged in offensive CNO, or otherwise define or 
minimize the authorities of organizations like USCYBERCOM. Rather, it proposes a 
linkage between the authorities that are traditionally responsible for mitigating espionage 
activates in the United States under Title 18 with those that have an increased 
cybersecurity mission to defend the nation under Title 10, i.e., USCYBERCOM. 
Combining these authorities produces the unity of effort required in U.S. policy 
documents and eliminates waste. 
However, instead of attempts to create a true DoD CI enterprise, new stove-pipes 
are created, as manifest in the recent operational authority vested within DIA DCHC. 
Time will tell if the new DCHC model will be effective, but it too will encounter 
profound structural problems due to the manner in which it was established. Zegart refers 
to initial agency design as a critical juncture in an agency’s ability to be effective later in 
its life cycle. DCHC is likely to have hiring practices that emphasize the need for 
experienced intelligence personal vice law enforcement. In fact, in the announcement of 
its offensive mission, DCHC specifically renounced the need for a law enforcement body 
to fulfill its role, and even went so far as to allude to the failure of CIFA in large part due 
to the assimilation of a law enforcement mindset and personnel where one was not 
necessary.279 
Such wrangling actually detracts from effectiveness in general and limits the 
ability of decision makers to create a true DoD CI enterprise. There is little debate in the 
United States about the law enforcement nature of counterintelligence. Attempts to parse 
this into defensive and offensive semantics do not otherwise take away from the 
recognized fact that counterintelligence in the United States is an inherently law 
                                                 
278 Joel Brenner, America the Vulnerable, 216. 
279 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Media Roundtable About the Establishment of the Defense 
Counterintelligence And Human Intelligence Center,” 11–12. 
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enforcement function. The parallel to this in the criminal world is the war on drugs. No 
one argues that the war on drugs within government is not a law enforcement function. 
As such, both the offensive and defense means of fighting this war are handled by law 
enforcement entities, most notably by the DEA. Yet, there is little speculation that DEA 
offensive operations that seek to identify, penetrate and ultimately mitigate drug cartels 
should be an intelligence function left solely for the CIA to implement. Rather, DEA’s 
offensive mission continues in the overseas environment, one that it conducts with 
intentional coordination with the CIA.  
In a similar vein, domestic discussions and statements about the law enforcement 
nature of offensive or defensive counterintelligence also necessitate the need for 
coordination and cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence. DIA’s attempt 
to restructure and develop another counterintelligence entity without law enforcement 
authorities not only undermines the charter of counterintelligence in the United States, 
but it fails to create the initial agency cooperation that is needed in the current 
environment. Such cooperation is even more critical in an environment of fiscal restraint 
and when facing a threat as significant as cyberespionage.    
F. ADDRESSING MICRO-RESTRUCTURING INTERNATIONALLY 
This thesis has analyzed numerous U.S. policy and strategy documents that apply 
to the current counterintelligence, intelligence and cyberspace environments. Each of 
these initiatives discusses the need to increase international cooperation to non-traditional 
allies in an effort to create a more effective national security posture. Evaluating the 
feasibility of expanding cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan has determined that there 
are political and security challenges that must be addressed prior to the development of a 
robust cooperative relationship. This analysis also suggests that the common 
cybersecurity threat optic that the United States and Taiwan share compels efforts that 
seek to build trust and lay the foundation for larger engagement in the future. The DoD 
has a unique role to play in providing for this initial foundation through its presently 
established relations with Taiwan’s national security establishment.  
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While the U.S. national security decision maker is not constrained from building 
partner capacity with Taiwan, the same cannot be said for Taiwan’s decision makers who 
appear concerned over PRC reactions. Ma Ying-jeou, the President of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan), in a speech he provided virtually to the Center for Strategic Studies in 
Washington D.C., voiced his political reluctance to exacerbate the PRC. Ma stated: 
For Cross-Strait relations to continue advancing, the U.S. must help 
Taiwan level the playing field. Negotiating with a giant like the Chinese 
mainland is not without its risks. The right leverage must be in place, 
otherwise Taiwan cannot credibly maintain an equal footing at the 
negotiation table.280  
Statements like this, along with research conducted during this thesis, make it safe to 
assume that Taiwan is clearly concerned about jeopardizing conciliatory relations 
between itself and the PRC. As such, any expansion of the existing U.S.-Taiwan 
relationship needs to be constructed in a manner that is mindful of this larger issue. USCI 
appears to have a unique role to play in developing the initial pathways of this capacity, 
because LE-LE liaison is a non-threatening way to address capability increases. 
Developing cooperative law enforcement forums, platforms or formally established 
channels for joint cybercrime investigation is a micro-approach to building trust while 
adhering to Taiwan’s concerns over disrupting the balance of cross-straits relations.   
The FMS model indicates that the risk of increasing Taiwanese capabilities is 
mitigated when there is strong domestic political support in the United States. 
Cyberespionage also has a degree of this domestic political support as represented by the 
American corporations who continually have their competitive advantage degraded 
through cyberespionage. While this domestic political pressure does not relinquish any of 
the concern that increased Taiwanese capabilities could be siphoned off to the PRC, it 
does compel the national security decision maker to initiate a dialogue with Taiwanese 
authorities regarding the initial stages of cooperation. This thesis concludes that initial 
cooperation could be as benign as helping Taiwan to increase its cyber-hygiene, or 
linking U.S. cybersecurity companies and insurance provides with Taiwan businesses to 
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Videoconference with Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C., May 12, 2011), 6. 
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provide cost effective solutions to cybersecurity issues. These activities are risk neutral 
and can set the scene for larger capacity development in the future. 
If it is later determined that more robust cyber cooperation can be achieved, then 
it is practical that USCI should play a major role in creating this capacity. While the DoD 
has firmly established relationships with Taiwan, the FBI would be the ideal candidate to 
lead a USCI initiative in building cybercrime reduction capacity in Taiwan. DoD CI 
would certainly play a large role in such an endeavor, but primarily as a means to address 
cyberespionage. Micro-restructuring in this regard changes the focus of DoD CI toward 
building partner capacity with Taiwan in a manner that takes into account the present 
security considerations. By deliberately employing a small capacity building process 
initially—as a means to build trust and test the political climate for increased 
cooperation—DoD CI could eventually realize increased effectiveness through shared 
knowledge of the cybersecurity threats faced by Taiwan.  
G. FINAL REMARKS 
The current structure of USCI is not properly geared toward the effective 
mitigation of national security risk. For all the references to a U.S. counterintelligence 
enterprise, the unsightly reality is that a true USCI enterprise does not exist in the United 
States today. Rather, individual counterintelligence agencies determine priorities and 
allocate resources independent from any type of national coordinating authority. This 
creates a counterintelligence process that is stove-piped, redundant and largely ineffective 
as each agency advances interests pursuant to their own course of action. As such, 
descriptions of a U.S. counterintelligence community that is fractured, myopic and 
marginally effective are unfortunately accurate. Attempts to bring about the unity of effort 
desperately needed within counterintelligence, as referenced in numerous 
counterintelligence strategy documents, has resulted in the development of large 
coordination entities absent the forcing mechanisms needed to compel integration.  
The establishment of the NCIX and CIFA are the best examples of this, and 
neither agency was provided the budgetary authority or operational oversight needed to 
force interagency collaboration, reduce redundancies or address efficiency. When asked 
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if the U.S. government takes the espionage threat from China seriously, former National 
Counterintelligence Executive Michael Van Cleave responded: 
I think that we are not presently structured, as a government, to take it 
seriously enough. We continue to play defense, we continue to wait until 
the cases manifest themselves here in the United States, and because that 
is the way we have gone about the counterintelligence business we are 
behind. (Question: How would you change things?) Someone be assigned 
the responsibility to identity, assess, and proactively degrade foreign 
intelligence threats against the United States. No one has that job today.281 
As the former lead authority on USCI structural matters, Van Cleave was uniquely 
positioned to make such a comment. She calls for a counterintelligence structure that 
unites the various elements around an offensive mission, a radical concept even today.  
The creation of a DoD counterintelligence enterprise should be simple enough. 
Four operational CI agencies fall under the direction of the Department of Defense, and 
all four must abide by decisions set forth by the Secretary of Defense. However, different 
cultures and parochial interests remain the primary obstacles to large-scale reform. In an 
environment absent the political will or monetary capital needed for macro-level reform, 
micro-approaches must be developed that establish a level of joint cooperation that 
increases DoD capacity to more effectively respond to national security threats.  
This thesis concludes that cyberespionage is one of the gravest threats facing the 
national security of the United States. This threat degrades the American economy 
through the theft of intellectual property and subsequent reduction of American 
commercial prowess. As such, cyberespionage decreases the true underpinnings of 
American power and the source of American influence around the world. This threat also 
substantially reduces the capacity of the American military. Theft of military secrets and 
technology allows potential advisories to close the technology gap that provides distinct 
advantage to America’s modern fighting force. The result is diminished capacity to 
project American power and the wasteful expenditure of trillions of dollars in research 
and development costs. 
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Current international attempts to curtail hostile cyber activity in cyberspace 
provide no short-term solutions for the national security decision maker who seeks 
options to address the cyberespionage threat. Recommendations that rely on international 
mechanisms, institutions or laws take too much time to implement and as such, fail to be 
effective solutions. Determining a path to increase counterintelligence effectiveness is the 
most viable solution for mitigating this threat in short order. Developing such a capacity 
increase around the cyberespionage threat provides a mission oriented approach that 
could lead to systemic changes in the future.  
Utilizing the JCIU model to develop joint operational support for the COCOM 
within each JCC provides a micro-restructuring solution that allows for the timely and 
effective mitigation of cyberespionage while at the same time eliminating stove-pipes and 
producing unity of effort within DoD CI. Such developments result in increased 
efficiency and effectiveness, two large benefits for national security capabilities in a 
fiscally restrained environment. Additionally, developing an operational cyberespionage 
mitigation capacity within each COCOM conforms to the intent of GWN without the 
need for legal interpretations that mandate such compliance. This structural reform can be 
established by the authorities vested within the Secretary of Defense. This omits many of 
the complications that would be present in cross-departmental structural reforms and 
provides a pathway for the alignment of needs with ways and means.  
Additional micro-restructuring places an emphasis on the degree to which 
increased cybersecurity cooperation can be developed with Taiwan. While there are 
political and security concerns on both the sides of this issue, this thesis has explored the 
ways in which LE-LE liaison can act in a non-threatening capacity to develop increased 
cooperation with Taiwan. To maximize effectiveness, this approach could be conducted 
in parallel with the sharing of best practices of cyber-hygiene. Both initiatives are micro-
approaches toward building trust and a mutually beneficial relationship that could one 
day develop into larger cooperation on cybersecurity issues. The shared cyberthreat 




relationship at the forefront of U.S. priorities for international cybersecurity engagement. 
Taking initial steps to explore this path is a low risk and responsible endeavor in the 
current threat environment.        
Minimizing redundancy between agencies—especially those that fall under the 
same executive department—should be considered a best practice in an era of fiscal 
restraint and heightened responsibility. Instituting a micro-restructuring approach for 
DoD CI agencies is an exercise in effective reform that can be accomplished within the 
constraints of the current environment. Should such a micro-restructuring approach be 
proven successful, it could pave the way for broader restructuring and the development of 
an actual DoD counterintelligence enterprise. Working to develop cooperative capacity 
with international partners is potentially a force multiplier for DoD CI, if conducted in a 
manner that minimizes risk and maximizes benefit. Using the national cyberthreat to 
develop increased counterintelligence effectiveness is a vital step in securing national 
security and addressing efficiency. Counterintelligence has always played an important 
role in safeguarding the nation; providing CI with an adequate structure to address 
contemporary challenges will assure that the United States retains its fundamental 
elements of national power. The current state of geopolitical affairs requires continued 
leadership from the United States, empowering it to maintain this role requires the 
effective mitigation of threats from its counterintelligence establishment.  
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